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This thesis consists of a summary and four papers. The ﬁrst two concerns
health care and sickness absence, and the last two pharmaceutical costs and
prices.
Paper [I] presents an economic federation model which resembles the sit-
uation in, for example, Sweden. In the model the state governments provide
health care, the federal government provides a sickness beneﬁt and both levels
tax labor income. The results show that the states can have either an incentive
to under- or over-provide health care. The federal government can, by intro-
ducing an intergovernmental transfer, induce the state governments to provide
the socially optimal amount of health care.
In Paper [II] the eﬀect of aggregated public health care expenditure on ab-
sence from work due to sickness or disability was estimated. The analysis was
based on data from a panel of the Swedish municipalities for the period 1993-
2004. Public health care expenditure was found to have no statistically signiﬁ-
cant eﬀect on absence and the standard errors were small enough to rule out all
but a minimal eﬀect. The result held when separate estimations were conducted
for women and men, and for absence due to sickness and disability.
T h ep u r p o s eo fP a p e r[ I I I ]w a st os t u d yt h ee ﬀects of the introduction of
ﬁxed pharmaceutical budgets for two health centers in Västerbotten, Sweden.
Estimation results using propensity score matching methods show that there are
no systematic diﬀerences for either price or quantity per prescription between
health centers using ﬁxed and open-ended budgets. The analysis was based on
individual prescription data from the two health centers and a control group
both before and after the introduction of ﬁxed budgets.
In Paper [IV] the introduction of the Swedish substitution reform in Octo-
ber 2002 was used as a natural experiment to examine the eﬀects of increased
consumer information on pharmaceutical prices. Using monthly data on indi-
vidual pharmaceutical prices, the average reduction of prices due to the reform
was estimated to four percent for both brand name and generic pharmaceuticals
during the ﬁrst four years after the reform. The results also show that the price
adjustment was not instant.
Key Words: vertical ﬁscal externalities, sickness absence, sickness beneﬁts,
health care expenditure, ﬁxed budgets, pharmaceuticals, cost containment, dy-
namic panel data models, endogeneity, propensity score matchingAcknowledgements
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1I n t r o d u c t i o n
This thesis consists of four papers which can be divided into two distinct parts.
The ﬁrst two papers concern the relationship between health care expenditure
and absence from work. Paper [I] studies resource allocation problems in a
situation where a lower level of government provides health care, the central
government provides a sickness beneﬁt and both levels tax labor income. In the
second paper, data from a panel of the Swedish municipalities during 1993-2004
was used to study the eﬀect of aggregated health care expenditure on absence.
The last two papers concern cost containment measures taken in the Swedish
pharmaceutical markets. The purpose of the third paper was to study whether
introducing ﬁxed pharmaceutical budgets for health centers is an eﬀective cost
containment measure. The analysis was based on data on individual prescrip-
tions from the county of Västerbotten, in which two health centers were given
ﬁxed budgets for pharmaceutical expenditures. Finally, in Paper [IV] a sub-
stitution reform in the Swedish pharmaceuticals market was used to study the
eﬀects of increased consumer information on pharmaceutical prices.
2 Health care and sickness absence
Health care in Sweden is nearly exclusively publicly provided and private expen-
diture accounts for only a few percent of total non-dental non-pharmaceutical
health care expenditure (Socialstyrelsen, 2006). Today 21 directly elected re-
gional authorities, county councils, are responsible for the public provision. The
number of entities has shrunk from 26 a decade ago and a government commis-
sion, analyzing the organization of the Swedish public sector, have recently
proposed a further reduction of the number of entities responsible for health
care provision (SOU 2007:10). The regional authorities ﬁnance more than two
thirds of their expenditure by proportional labor income taxes. Other impor-
tant incomesources are grants from the central government, payments from
other principals and patients’ co-payments (Statistics Sweden; The Swedish As-
sociation of Local Authorities and Regions).
In Sweden, the rate of absence from work due to sickness and disability is
much higher than in most industrialized countries (OECD, 2005). The rates
peaked in 2003 when 5 percent of employee working hours were lost due to
sickness absence and 8 percent of the population between the age of 16 and2 Summary
64 years were on disability pension (Statistics Sweden; The Swedish Social In-
surance Agency). One explanation for these high rates is the relatively gen-
e r o u ss i c k n e s sb e n e ﬁt that the central government provides.1 During the last
two decades the compensation levels in the public social insurance system have
been above 75 percent of the income from the second day of absence, but with
a cap at a certain level of income (Henrekson and Persson, 2004; the Swedish
Social Insurance Agency). A second explanation for the high rates is the long
waiting times in the health care sector.2 For example, the waiting time for a
primary hip joint operation has exceeded one and a half years in some parts of
the country (The Swedish Association of Local Authorities and Regions).
Paper [I] studies the eﬀects of division of power between lower-level gov-
ernments that provide health care and a central government that provides a
sickness beneﬁt. This paper relates to the literature about vertical ﬁscal exter-
nalities. Paper [II] studies the eﬀects of health care expenditure on absence.
It primarily relates to the literature evaluating the eﬀects of aggregated health
care expenditure and access to health care, but since the eﬀects of health care
provided by the Swedish county councils aﬀect the central government’s budget
constraint, the paper also relates to the empirical literature on vertical ﬁscal
interactions. The existing literature in these ﬁelds is reviewed brieﬂyb e l o wa n d
thereafter the two papers are summarized.3
2.1 Vertical ﬁscal externalities
The literature about vertical ﬁscal externalities belongs to the broader group
concerning ﬁscal federalism. Earlier papers in this ﬁeld focused nearly exclu-
sively on horizontal interactions between lower-level governments “states”, and
limited the role of the central “federal” government to one that only steps in to
resolve the ineﬃciencies arising from inter-state interactions (Keen, 1998).
Vertical ﬁscal externalities arise when decisions of governments at one level
aﬀect the budget constraint of governments at another level. An early paper
1Using Swedish data, Johansson and Brännäs (1998), Johansson and Palme (2002, 2005)
and Henrekson and Persson (2004) all found support for that economic incentives aﬀect ab-
sence.
2Using data from ﬁve orthopedic clinics, Statskontoret (2000) found that waiting times
aﬀected absence from work.
3In addition, Paper [II] relates to the literature on absence. For a review of this literature
I refer to Brown and Sessions (1996).Summary 3
in this ﬁeld is Cassing and Hillman (1982). They analyzed an Australian case,
in which the federal government taxes coal exports and a state government im-
plicitly taxes coal by using its railway monopoly to set excess rail freights on
coal transports. Cassing and Hillman demonstrated that total revenues become
lower if the federal and state separately try to maximize their revenues, com-
pared to a cooperative solution. Hansson and Stuart (1987), Flowers (1988)
and Johnson (1988) were the ﬁrst to analyze vertical ﬁscal externalities when
federal and state governments impose direct taxes on the same tax base. Flow-
ers provided a result similar to that of Cassing and Hillman, namely that a
federation of Leviathan revenue maximizing governments will set taxes above
the revenue maximizing level. Johnson demonstrated that a state, by using own
taxes to ﬁnance redistribution, will reduce income in the state and therefore the
residents’ federal tax bill. In a situation without migration, Johnson showed
that this will make the state’s residents prefer redistribution using state taxes
as opposed to federal ones.
To avoid ineﬃciency caused by vertical ﬁscal externality Hansson and Stuart
(1987), Boadway and Keen (1996) and Boadway et al. (1998) proposed the
power of taxation to be assigned to only one level of government. Aronsson
and Wikström (2001, 2003) demonstrated that this may be unnecessary, since
intergovernmental transfer schemes can, in certain situations, induce the correct
incentives for the governments.
Only a minority of the literature on vertical ﬁscal externalities includes ex-
penditure externalities, deﬁned as the eﬀects of a government’s expenditure
decisions on other governments’ budget constraints. Noteworthy exceptions
are Dahlby (1996) and Dahlby and Wilson (2003). Dahlby exempliﬁed tax
and expenditure externalities and provided general formulas for revenue and
expenditure matching grants which can make the governments internalize the
externalities. Dahlby and Wilson presented a model where a state government
provides a productivity-enhancing public input and both levels of government
tax wages and corporate proﬁts. They demonstrated that the vertical external-
ity could be either positive or negative depending on the wage elasticity of the
labor demand.
Two empirical papers on ﬁscal interactions are Besley and Rosen (1998) and
Goodspeed (2000); both report evidence of tax interactions between govern-
ments. Aronsson et al. (2000) and Andersson et al. (2004) are two studies4 Summary
in this area that use Swedish data. Aronsson et al. found that local expendi-
ture is partly explained by regional expenditure and Andersson et al. report
that an increase in the regional tax rate induces municipalities in the region to
lower their tax rates. In a recent study using Swiss data Brulhart and Jametti
(2006) found that vertical externalities, working for too high taxes, dominate
horizontal externalities.
2.2 Health care outcomes
Papers accessing the eﬀects of health care on an aggregated level diﬀer both
in terms of dependent and explanatory variables used. Naturally, as depen-
dent variable most studies have used some measure of health status (Nixon and
Ulmann, 2006). Infant mortality and life expectancy are often chosen, presum-
ably because that these variables are objective and reasonable easily to measure.
The drawback of these measures is that health care has other outcomes than
extended life spans that are not captured by these variables, e.g. improvements
in health related quality of life. Variables including quality of life are more
subjective, less often available, and are therefore not commonly used in the lit-
erature. One exception is Miller and Frech (2002). In a cross-section analysis of
18 OECD countries they found signiﬁcant eﬀects of pharmaceutical expenditure
on disability adjusted life expectancy (DALE) but insigniﬁcant eﬀects of other
health care expenditure.
The measures of health care inputs also diﬀer among studies in this ﬁeld.
Many researchers have used expenditure on health care, often disaggregated
to pharmaceutical expenditure and other health care expenditure, as their pri-
mary explanatory variables (e.g. Hitiris and Posnet, 1992; Crémieux et al.,
1999; Lichtenberg, 2004). Hitiris and Posnet used data from 20 OECD countries
over 28 years and found limited eﬀects of health care expenditure on mortality
rates. Crémieux et al. found that higher health care expenditure among Cana-
dian provinces reduced infant mortality and increased life expectancy. They
explained the limited eﬀect reported by Hitiris and Posnet and others by the
inherent heterogeneity associated with cross-country studies. Lichtenberg ana-
lyzed time-series of life expectancy in the United States and found that both
public health care expenditure and research and development expenditure on
pharmaceuticals had positive eﬀects.
Aakvik and Holmås (2006) studied the eﬀect of the number of general prac-Summary 5
titioners (GPs) on mortality rates in Norwegian municipalities using an instru-
mental variable estimator. They found no eﬀect of the total number GPs per
capita but found a statistically signiﬁcant negative eﬀect of the number of con-
tracted GPs.
All the studies discussed above are troubled by the context in which deci-
sions regarding health care are taken. For example, the amount of health care
provided is partly determined by the perceived need for health care. This re-
sults in endogeneity problems, which are not addressed properly in all studies.
One study not aﬀected by such problems is Brook et al. (1983). They reported
results from a controlled trial in the United States (the Rand Health Insurance
Experiment) where families were randomly assigned insurance plans. One group
received all their medical care free of charge and, as a consequence, used more
than the other groups. The only statistically signiﬁcant eﬀe c t so nh e a l t hs t a t u s
were improvements for those with poor vision and for low-income persons with
high blood pressure.
2.3 Summary of Papers [I] and [II]
Paper [I]: Sickness absence and health care in an economic federation
In Paper [I] an economic federation model is presented, where the state
governments provide health care, the federal government provides a sickness
beneﬁt and both levels of government tax labor income. The objective of this
paper was twofold. First, to analyze the ﬁscal externalities facing the state
governments and to characterize the diﬀerences in health care expenditure and
sickness beneﬁt between the centralized and decentralized solutions. Second, to
analyze the diﬀerent ways in which the second best solution can be obtained by
changing the governments’ responsibilities or policy instruments.
The results show that the states can either have an incentive to under- or
over-provide health care depending on, among other things, the wage elasticity
of labor supply and the marginal product of expenditure on health care. The
federal government can induce the states to increase their health care expendi-
ture by reducing the sickness beneﬁt and the federal tax rate, and vice versa.
Whether health care will be under- or over-provided in the decentralized solution
depends on the sign of the ﬁscal externality facing the states, the social costs of
ﬁnancing the sickness beneﬁt and on the slope of the states’ reaction functions.
By introducing an intergovernmental transfer, the federal government can make6 Summary
the state governments internalize the eﬀects that their decisions will have on
the federal government’s budget constraint. Moreover, it was proved that the
vertical ﬁscal externality will not vanish by assigning all powers of taxation to
the states. This result diﬀers from previous ones presented in the literature and
is caused by the fact that the states’ decisions in this model directly aﬀect the
federal government’s expenditure.
The results can be generalized to state ﬁnanced programs which reduce the
number of recipients of federal transfers, for example labor market programs,
economic development ventures aimed at reducing poverty and programs aimed
at reducing the abuse of federal transfers.
Paper [II]: The eﬀect of health care expenditure on sickness absence
The purpose of Paper [II] was to estimate how aggregated public expenditure
on health care aﬀects absence from work due to sickness or disability. To my
knowledge, this has not been studied previously.
First, two equations were derived; one that illustrates how absence is aﬀected
by health and other variables, and another that shows how health can be aﬀected
by public health care expenditure. Then these equations were used in order
to specify an empirical model. The analysis was performed using data from
a panel of the Swedish municipalities during 1993-2004 and an instrumental
variable estimator was used to avoid the potential endogeneity problem caused
by absence aﬀecting expenditure on health care.
Public health care expenditure was found to have no statistically signiﬁcant
eﬀect on absence and the standard errors were small enough to rule out all but
a minimal eﬀect. This result is robust against changes in model speciﬁcation
and also held when separate estimations were conducted for women and men,
and for absence due to sickness and disability.
The main result (that public health care expenditure had a negligible eﬀect
on absence) increases the likelihood that general health care is over-provided in
Sweden, according to the model in Paper [I]. However, the low eﬀect of health
care expenditure may be explained by the Swedish counties’ weak incentive to
reduce absence which may lead to that a relatively small share of total health
care expenditure being focused on reducing absence. Therefore, although ag-
gregated health care expenditure may be over-provided, health care aimed at
reducing absence might still be under-provided.Summary 7
3 Pharmaceutical costs and prices
The Swedish real pharmaceutical costs have doubled in the last 15 years. In
2005 the costs reached 30 billions Swedish crowns and accounted for 13 percent
of total health care expenditure (Socialstyrelsen, 2003, 2006). The Swedish de-
velopment parallels that of many other industrialized countries and has spurred
an interest in diﬀerent methods to contain pharmaceutical costs (Buzzelli et al.,
2006).
Since 1993, the price-setting of pharmaceuticals has been unregulated, but
for pharmaceuticals to be subsidized, the price charged by the pharmaceutical
ﬁrms has to be authorized by the Pharmaceutical Beneﬁts Board (PBB). During
the past six decades, subsidies have covered a large part of the pharmaceutical
costs for Swedish consumers and in 2005 nearly two thirds of the costs were
covered by subsidies (Socialstyrelsen, 2006).
In the Swedish pharmaceutical insurance system consumers have to pay
all costs below 900 Swedish crowns per year. Then, the subsidy rate gradually
increases and all costs exceeding 4,300 Swedish crowns are covered by the insur-
ance (Socialstyrelsen, 2000). There are, however, some exceptions. From 1993
to October 2002 a reference price system was in eﬀect, under which all costs
exceeding 110 percent of the price of the least expensive generic substitute also
had to be borne by the consumer.4 On October 1, 2002 a substitution reform
came into eﬀect, requiring consumers who refused to switch to the cheapest
available substitute to also pay the diﬀerence in price between this pharmaceu-
tical and the prescribed one. A key motive behind this reform was to contain
pharmaceutical costs (SOU 2000:86). This was also an important motivation
for the decentralization of the costs for the pharmaceutical insurance from the
central government to the regional governments, that took place in 1998 (So-
cialstyrelsen, 2000).
In the county of Västerbotten two health centers were, in 2004, given ﬁxed
pharmaceutical budgets. Paper [III] studies the eﬀects on pharmaceutical costs
of this hardening of previously soft budget constraints. In Paper [IV] the sub-
stitution reform is used to study the eﬀects of increased consumer information
on pharmaceutical prices. The existing literature in each of these two ﬁelds is
reviewed brieﬂy below and thereafter the two papers are summarized.
4The eﬀects of the reference price system have been analyzed by e.g. Aronsson et al. (2001)
and Bergman and Rudholm (2003).8 Summary
3.1 Soft budget constraints
The term “soft budget constraint” was originally used by Kornai (1979) to
denote the budget constraints of enterprises in socialist economies in which
deﬁcits were nearly automatically covered by authorities. Primary explanations
for the existence of soft budget constraints are asymmetry in information and
lack of credible commitments by principals. For example, an investor may when
setting up an enterprise, in order to provide management with strong incentives,
declare that no additional founds will be provided even if the enterprise would
encounter ﬁnancial diﬃculties. Thus, the concept is closely related to that of
time inconsistency (Kyland and Prescott, 1977). The term is also related to
the “ratchet-eﬀect” (Weitzman, 1980), e.g. that a principal may adjust budgets
a c c o r d i n gt oh i s t o r y ,c r e a t i n ga ni n c e n t i v ef o ra g e n t st oo v e r s p e n dt op r e c l u d e
future budget cuts. If the agent realizes that its budget constraint is not hard,
this will aﬀect its decisions.
The early literature in the ﬁeld focused nearly exclusively on state owned
enterprises in socialist economies. At present, the concept is also used in ana-
lyzes of markets in primarily capitalistic ones. Soft budget constraints clearly
apply to the bank sector in most economies, since large banks with severe ﬁ-
nancial trouble are rarely left without ﬁnancial assistance and forced to go out
of business. The concept can also be used to understand the behavior of local
and regional governments, which frequently can rely on being rescued by the
central government, and that of poor countries which might obtain international
assistance if they become insolvent (Kornai et al., 2003). Further, the budget
constraints of nonproﬁt organizations, such as hospitals and schools, are often
soft. For example, Duggan (2000) found clear support for the existence of soft
budget constraints for government-owned hospitals in California. Studying the
eﬀects of a state-program which made it more proﬁtable to treat the poor, he
reported that local government reduced their subsidies to public hospitals by
on average one dollar for each additional dollar the hospital earned due to the
state-program.
The eﬀects of hardening budget constraint on pharmaceutical costs have
been analyzed previously by Whynes et al. (1997). They used cross-sectional
data from one English health authority and regressed pharmaceutical costs per
patient for each general practitioner (GP). After controlling for ﬁve confound-
ing factors, they found that GPs that held their own budgets (and thus hadSummary 9
harder budget constraints) had approximately 8 percent lower pharmaceutical
costs. However, based on their study it is not possible to separate selection and
treatment eﬀects; it was voluntary for GPs to hold their own budgets and it
is therefore possible that those who opted for this were those with low initial
pharmaceutical costs.
3.2 Consumer Information and Prices
The role of information in economics was largely ignored until Stigler (1961)
published his paper on the economics of information. He illustrated that if it
is costly to ascertain the most favorable price of a product ﬁrms will get mar-
ket power and set prices above competitive levels. Similarly, Diamond (1971)
showed that if information is costly, this could lead to an equilibrium where
ﬁrms charge monopoly prices. Salop and Stiglitz (1977) presented a model
where low-cost stores had higher sales because low search cost individuals ac-
tively seek them out, while only high search cost individuals patronized the high
cost stores. They also showed that there may exist equilibrium with a single
price, which is above the competitive equilibrium price, and that no equilibrium
exists under certain circumstances.
Empirical tests of the eﬀects of increased consumer information on prices
and market structure are becoming increasingly common. Devine and Mar-
ion (1979) collected price information for supermarkets in Ottawa and then
published these during a ﬁve week period. Compared to the control market,
Winnipeg, price levels decreased and consumer satisfaction increased in Ot-
tawa. However, Devine and Marion’s paper was later commented on by Lesser
and Bryant (1980), who criticized the statistical analysis performed. Recently,
empirical papers analyzing the impact of lower search costs through the intro-
duction of internet price comparison sites on price or price dispersion have been
published (Baylis and Perloﬀ, 2002; Baye et al., 2004). The ﬁndings from these
papers show that price dispersion remains even on internet price comparison
sites, which according to Bayliss and Perloﬀ could be explained by the division
of consumers into two groups, informed and uninformed.
Frank and Salkever (1992) presented a theoretical model for brand name
pharmaceutical prices and showed that these will decrease if the share of in-
formed consumers increases. Sorensen (2000) studied how imperfect consumer
information aﬀected prices and price dispersion among prescription pharma-10 Summary
ceuticals. The data was collected from pharmacies in upstate New York, and
the price dispersion among equivalent prescriptions was found to be large. The
results also give support to a consumer search cost model, since both markups
and price dispersion were signiﬁcantly lower for frequently purchased pharma-
ceuticals compared to one-time prescription pharmaceuticals.
3.3 Summary of Papers [III] and [IV]
Paper [III]: Fixed budgets as a cost containment measure for phar-
maceuticals
In 2001, two health centers in Västerbotten, Sweden, were given ﬁxed bud-
gets for pharmaceutical expenditure, giving them an incentive to decrease ex-
penditure as they were allowed to keep any surplus (and would be forced to
repay any deﬁcit) generated during the year. The purpose of Paper [III] was
to analyze if this reform aﬀected the prices and quantities of pharmaceuticals
prescribed by physicians working at these health centers.
The analysis was based on data on individual prescriptions from the two
health centers and a control group, both before and after the introduction of
ﬁxed budgets. Changes in pharmaceutical expenditure were decomposed into
three parts; the number of prescriptions, the size of prescriptions (the number
of deﬁned daily doses per prescription), and the price of the pharmaceutical.
Ad i ﬀerence-in-diﬀerence extension of propensity score matching was used to
study if physicians responded to the budgetary rules by prescribing cheaper
medicine or fewer doses of medicine per prescription. This method allowed us
to control for observable heterogeneity between patients and for time-invariant
unobservable heterogeneity between diﬀerent health centers.
The results show no systematic eﬀect of the introduction of ﬁxed budgets on
either price or quantity per prescription, possibly due to physicians not viewing
the ﬁxed budgets to be credible. However, the number of prescriptions in the
two health centers with ﬁxed budgets declined relative to the control group after
the introduction of the ﬁxed budgets.
Paper [IV]: Consumer Information and Pharmaceutical Prices: The-
ory and Evidence
In Paper [IV] the impact of increased consumer information on brand name
and generic pharmaceutical prices was analyzed both theoretically and empir-Summary 11
ically. The theoretical results show that an increase in information is likely to
reduce the price of brand name pharmaceuticals, while the results regarding
generics are less clear.
In the empirical part of the paper, the introduction of the substitution reform
in the Swedish pharmaceutical market in October 2002 was used as a natural
experiment to examine the eﬀects of increased consumer information on phar-
maceutical prices. The main hypothesis to be tested was if the substitution
reform, by increasing consumer information about pharmaceutical prices and
available generic substitutes, decreased the price of brand name and/or generic
pharmaceuticals. In addition, we tested whether the possible price response
diﬀered between brand name and generic drugs and studied additional hetero-
geneity in the reform eﬀect, suggested by the theoretical model. The empirical
analysis was based on monthly data on pharmaceuticals sold January 2001 to
October 2006 and performed using a Prais-Winsten estimator.
The results from the empirical part of the paper show an average reduction
in prices due to the reform of about 4 percent during the period under study,
both for brand name- and generic pharmaceuticals. In addition, the results
give some support for the reform eﬀect being ampliﬁed for pharmaceuticals
in markets which had previously been characterized by low levels of consumer
information, as well as for pharmaceuticals which prior to the reform had high
markups over marginal cost. The results also indicate that the introduction of
the reform increased the impact of the number of products on pharmaceutical
prices. Finally, the price adjustment was found to be gradual.12 Summary
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This paper addresses vertical ﬁscal externalities in a model where the
state governments provide health care and the federal government pro-
v i d e sas i c k n e s sb e n e ﬁt. Both levels of government tax labor income and
policy decisions aﬀect labor income as well as participation in the labor
market. The results show that the vertical externality aﬀecting the state
governments’ policy decisions can be either positive or negative depend-
ing on, among other things, the wage elasticity of labor supply and the
marginal product of expenditure on health care. Moreover, it is proved
that the vertical ﬁscal externality will not vanish by assigning all powers
of taxation to the states.
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1I n t r o d u c t i o n
In Sweden, there is an ongoing debate concerning the high rates of absence from
work for health related reasons. The rates have risen signiﬁcantly over the last
decade and, in 2004, 5.2 percent of employee working hours were lost due to
sickness absence. At the same time 8.1 percent of the population between the
age of 16 and 64 years were on disability pension. One explanation for these
h i g hr a t e si st h eh i g hb e n e ﬁt levels and the relatively loose regulations regarding
sick leave and disability pensions in Sweden. A complementary explanation is
the long waiting time for many surgical operations. For example, the waiting
time for a primary hip joint operation exceeds one and a half years in some
parts of the country.1
In Sweden, the levels of the publicly provided sickness beneﬁt and disability
pension are decided by central government. However, the county councils are
responsible for providing health care. The question that arises, on the basis of
this division of power between the two levels of government, is whether it leads
to a suboptimal allocation of resources. In this paper an economic federation
model is presented, where the state governments provide health care, the fed-
eral government provides a sickness beneﬁt and both levels tax labor income.2
The model resembles the situation in countries such as Finland and Sweden.
The purpose of this paper is twofold. First, to analyze the ﬁscal externalities
facing the state governments and to characterize the diﬀerences in health care
expenditure and level of the sickness beneﬁt between the centralized and the
decentralized solutions. Second, to analyze the diﬀerent ways in which the sec-
ond best solution can be obtained by changing the governments’ responsibilities
or policy instruments. In order to focus on vertical externalities, this paper
ignores the horizontal ones.
The paper primary relates to the literature concerning vertical ﬁscal exter-
nalities but also to the literature relating to absence from work. Brown and
Sessions (1996) provide a survey of the literature in the latter ﬁeld. Most of
1The data are obtained from Statistics Sweden (www.scb.se), The Swedish Social Insurance
Agency (www.forsakringskassan.se) and The Swedish Association of Local Authorities and
Regions (sas.lf.se).
2In this paper "federal government" is used to denote the central government and "state
government" is used to denote the lower level of government, like state, regional or local level
government.2 Sickness absence and health care in an economic federation
the literature in this area is empirical and includes estimations of the eﬀects
of working conditions, stipulated work time, job satisfaction and overtime, on
work absence. Also, the literature provides strong support for the idea that
economic incentives impact upon absence behavior.
Vertical ﬁscal externalities when federal and state governments impose taxes
on the same tax base were ﬁrst considered by Hansson and Stuart (1987), Flow-
ers (1988) and Johnson (1988). Flowers showed that a federation of Leviathan
revenue maximizing governments will end up on the downward sloping section
of the Laﬀer curve. Johnson showed that residents of a state prefer to redis-
tribute using state taxes as opposed to federal taxes since this, by reducing the
money income in the state, reduces the state’s federal tax bill, meaning that
some of the cost of the redistribution will be born by residents of other states.
To deal with the vertical ﬁscal externality Hansson and Stuart (1987), Boad-
way and Keen (1996) and Boadway et al. (1998) proposed that the power of
taxation be assigned to only one level of government. Aronsson and Wikström
(2001, 2003) showed that intergovernmental transfer schemes can, in certain
situations, induce the correct incentives, making it unnecessary to restrict the
taxation power to one level of government.3
The majority of the literature in this ﬁeld focuses on the externality that
arises from the co-occupancy of a common tax base, as opposed to expenditure
externalities, and has come to the conclusion that the vertical externality is
negative.4 An interesting exception is Dahlby and Wilson (2003). In their
model a state government provides a productivity-enhancing public input and
both levels of government tax wages and corporate proﬁts. They show that the
vertical externality can be either positive or negative depending on the wage
elasticity of the labor demand. In this paper, a diﬀerent kind of expenditure
externality is examined. Instead of providing a productivity-enhancing public
input, the states in this paper provide a private good, health care, which aﬀects
the fraction of the population that is able to work. The state’s decisions not only
aﬀect the federal government’s tax revenues but also aﬀect its sickness beneﬁt
expenditure. The results show that the states will have an incentive to either
under-provide or over-provide health care depending on, among other things,
3Keen (1998) reviewed the literature on vertical ﬁscal externalities.
4Tax and expenditure externalities are here deﬁned as the eﬀects of a government tax and
the eﬀects of expenditure decisions, respectively, on other governments’ budget constraints.Sickness absence and health care in an economic federation 3
the wage elasticity of the labor supply and the marginal product of expenditure
on health care at the equilibrium. The federal government can induce the states
to increase (reduce) their expenditure on health care, by reducing (increasing)
the sickness beneﬁt and the federal tax rate. Whether health care will be under-
or over-provided in the decentralized solution depends on the sign of the ﬁscal
externality facing the states, the social costs of ﬁnancing the sickness beneﬁt
and on the slope of the states’ reaction functions. The federal government is
able to achieve the second best solution if it is given the possibility of deciding
an intergovernmental transfer.
In comparison to earlier studies, this paper contributes to the literature
by letting the state governments provide a good that aﬀects the share of the
population that works and hence the federal government’s transfers to those not
working. The results can be generalized to state ﬁnanced programs which reduce
the number of recipients of federal transfers, for example labor market programs,
economic development ventures aimed at reducing poverty and programs aimed
at reducing the abuse of federal transfers. Another contribution is that this
paper shows that vertical externalities will not vanish by assigning all powers
of taxation to the state governments if federal expenditure depends directly on
the decisions taken by the states.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: In section 2 the model is set
up and the decision rules for a unitary central government, which will serve as
a benchmark in the following, are derived. Section 3 presents the decentralized
solution. First, in subsection 3.1 the policy decisions that the state governments
will take if they act as Nash competitors to one another and towards the federal
government are examined and compared with the policy decisions of the unitary
central government. Here the states’ reactions to changes in the federal gov-
ernments’ policy variables are also derived. The following subsection describes
the policy decisions taken by the federal government, when it acts as a ﬁrst
mover. Diﬀerent ways of implementing the second best solution are discussed
in subsection 3.3. Finally, in section 4 the paper’s conclusions are presented.
2 The model
The federation consists of N identical states, which are small relative to the
federation. Each state is populated by a continuum of residents normalized4 Sickness absence and health care in an economic federation
to unity. The federal government pays a sickness beneﬁt to individuals on
sick leave and the state governments are responsible for providing health care.
Following Boadway and Keen (1996), both levels of government are assumed to
ﬁnance their expenditure via a proportional labor income tax and to balance
their budgets. Residents are assumed to be immobile between states and beneﬁt
spillovers from health care are assumed not to exist. These assumptions allow
us to focus on the vertical ﬁscal externalities and ignore possible horizontal
externalities. Since the states are identical, no index for states is used and the
analysis is focused on a representative state, and due to the lack of horizontal
externalities N is normalized to one.
The utility function of an individual is written, Ui = u(c,l,h) − g(mi),
where i ∈ [0,1], c is private consumption, l labor supply and h health state.
Preferences are identical and the utility is increasing in c,d e c r e a s i n gi nl and
strictly concave in c and l. Individuals have no access to capital markets, so
they consume all of their income. There are two health states; healthy, hh,
and sick, hs,w h e r et h eﬁrst yields higher utility for given levels of c and l.
mi ∈ [m,m] is a moral parameter that varies continuously among individuals
and has a rectangular distribution. −g(m) shows the non-pecuniary disutility
from pretending to be sick, when healthy. A high value of m depicts a high
moral and g is assumed to be increasing and concave in m.
By letting individuals diﬀer in respect to a moral parameter, I allow for
the possibility of a positive fraction of mimickers in the respective solutions.
The motive for doing so is primarily to add realism to the model. In reality
individuals are heterogeneous and it is, therefore, sub-optimal for a government
with limited instruments to form policies so that no one mimics another. Second,
letting the individuals be heterogeneous in this respect makes it possible to
d e m o n s t r a t eh o wt h ep r e s e n c eo fm i m i c k e r sa ﬀects the vertical externalities.
An alternative to including moral in this form is to allow for heterogeneity with
respect to the value of consumption or leisure, or to allow for a continuum of
health states. Additive separability in g is assumed for simplicity.
The health function, equation (1) below, which is the steady state solution
to the dynamic equation,5 describes the relationship between the sickness rate
5The dynamic equation is written
.
a = d(1 − a) − ra− f(e).Sickness absence and health care in an economic federation 5





Healthy individuals turn sick at the exogenous rate d and sick individuals recover
by themselves at the exogenous rate r.B o t hd and r take values between zero
and one. f(e) denotes the rate at which the population recovers as a result of
medical treatment.6 Health care is assumed to be exclusively ﬁnanced by the
governments and patients are assumed to experience no disutility by treatment.
f0 > 0 and f00 < 0 are assumed, stating that health care expenditure have a
positive eﬀect on the number of recoveries but that the eﬀect of expenditure is
decreasing.7
The justiﬁcation for the assumption that health care is exclusively ﬁnanced
by the governments is two-fold. First, the purpose of this paper is to study the
interactions between diﬀerent levels of government when health care and sick-
ness beneﬁts are publicly provided. Second, incorporating motives for the public
provision, instead of just assuming it, would complicate the model without con-
tributing to the understanding of the problem. Among the possible motives for
the public provision of health care and sickness beneﬁt, distributional objectives
and adverse selection can be mentioned.
In the model presented here, all sick individuals will be on sick leave. Healthy
individuals can either work (workers) or be on sick leave (mimickers). Let
s(e)=a(e)+ˆ a(1−a(e)),w h e r es(e) is the absence rate8 and ˆ a is the fraction of
healthy individuals who are mimickers. Both levels of government are assumed
to know the size of f(e) for all possible levels of e as well as the value of the
parameters r and d; a(e), s(e) and ˆ a are also assumed to be observable by them.
However, the governments can not observe an individual’s morals or whether the
individual is sick or a mimicker. In reality, governments that provide sickness
6Since the population is constant, this is a way of modeling the number of treated individ-
uals as a monotone function of health care expenditure, but does not imply that that medical
treatment is applied to the whole population. An alternative would be to let f(e) denote the
rate at which the sick fraction of the population recovers as a result of medical treatment.
However, this would imply that the cost of treating a given share of the sick is independent
of the number of sick individuals, which is clearly unrealistic.
7Expenditure on health care might aﬀect the sickness rate by, for example, leading to a
reduction in waiting times or improved procedures.
8In this paper, the absence rate can be interpreted to include not only the sickness absence
rate among employees, but also the rate of individuals on disability pension.6 Sickness absence and health care in an economic federation
beneﬁts often attempt to distinguish mimickers from the sick by requiring a
doctor’s certiﬁcate as a prerequisite for receiving a sickness beneﬁt, at least for
long-term sick leave. However, physicians cannot distinguish perfectly between
a sick individual and a mimicker, and even if they can, the incentives to reveal a
mimicker is often limited (see e.g. Shortell (1998) for a discussion of physician’s
multiple accountabilities). The governments are, therefore, unlikely to be able
to identify all mimickers. One could model this by introducing some probability
for a mimicker to be detected and perhaps a penalty if detected. This would
reduce the problem with mimickers, but would not change the general results.
Further as introducing this factor would complicate the model, the extreme case
where governments have no possibility of detecting a mimicker is chosen.
The private agents are assumed to make their choices concerning labor sup-
ply and sick leave after the governments’ policies have been proclaimed. The
workers choose consumption and labor supply to maximize their utility, subject
to their budget constraints
c = w(1 − t − T)l,
where t and T are tax rates imposed by the state and federal governments,
respectively, and w is the exogenously given real wage rate. The outcome of a
worker’s optimization problems will be c = c(w(1−t−T)) and l = l(w(1−t−T)).
For individuals on sick leave c = B,w h e r eB is the sickness beneﬁt. The indirect
utility function for workers, and the conditional indirect utility functions for
mimickers and sick individuals, respectively, are written
V h = v(w(1 − t − T),h h),
c V h
i = e v(B,hh) − g(mi),
V s = e v(B,hs),
where tilde indicates that the indirect utilities for mimickers and sick individuals
are conditioned on the labor supply being ﬁxed at zero. Healthy individuals will
be on sick leave if
e v(B,hh) − g(mi) ≥ v(w(1 − t − T),h h),( 2 )
therefore ˆ a =ˆ a(t,T,B). Equation (2) tells us that for the last individual who
chooses to be a mimicker mi = g−1(x),w h e r ex = e v(B,hh) − v(w(1 − t −Sickness absence and health care in an economic federation 7
T),h h). The rectangular distribution of m, together with the concavity of g(m),






= g−10(x)v0(w(1 − t − T),h h)w>0
∂ˆ a
∂B







∂T2 = −g−10(x)v00(w(1 − t − T),h h)w2
+g−100(x)[v0(w(1 − t − T),h h)w]2 > 0
∂2ˆ a
∂t∂B
= v0(w(1 − t − T),h h)wg−100(x)e v0(B,hh) ≥ 0
∂2ˆ a
∂B2 = g−10(x)e v00(B,hh)+g−100(x)[e v0(B,hh)]2 R 0.
Ranking individuals by increasing morals and assuming the welfare objective
to be utilitarian9, permits the governments’ objective function to be written




[e v(B,hh) − g(mi)]di.( 3 )
2.1 Centralized policy decisions
In this section the policy decisions that a central government in a unitary nation
would take, in the absence of any ﬁscal responsibility of any lower level of gov-
ernment, are derived. These policy decisions will later be used as a benchmark
against which the decentralized policy decisions will be compared. When all
policy decisions are made by the central government there is no need to distin-
guish between the federal and state tax rates. It is therefore assumed that the
9One could allow the governments to diﬀerently weight the utility of workers, sick individ-
uals and mimickers. Perhaps the most reasonable alteration would be to assign a lower weight
to mimickers, since they abuse the system (see e.g. Sandmo (1981) for a discussion about
this). This would aﬀect the decisions taken both in the centralized and decentralized setting,
but would not contribute to the understanding of the vertical ﬁscal externalities analyzed in
this paper. Since this also would expand the notation and require more extensive explanations
of the equations to follow, this is not done. However, the main eﬀects of assigning a lower
weight to mimickers will be mentioned in the paper.8 Sickness absence and health care in an economic federation
government chooses a single rate τ = T + t. The decision variables are τ, B
and e. The second order conditions for maximums are assumed to be fulﬁlled
and the solution is assumed to imply positive levels for all variables. The opti-
mization problem of the central government in a unitary nation coincides with
the social optimization problem and can be written
Max
τ,B,e




[e v(B,hh) − g(mi)]di
subject to the budget constraint
(1 − a(e))(1 − ˆ a)τwl− (a(e)+ˆ a(1 − a(e)))B − e =0 ,
where a(e), ˆ a and l are deﬁned as before. The Lagrangian becomes




[e v(B,hh) − g(mi)]di
+ γ{(1 − a(e))(1 − ˆ a)τwl− (a(e)+ˆ a(1 − a(e)))B − e},
where γ is the Lagrangian multiplier, which at the optimum can be interpreted
as the marginal cost of public funds. Given that the condition in equation (2)
results in equally high utilities for a worker and for the last individual who
chooses to be a mimicker, the ﬁrst order conditions can be written
τ : −(1 − ˆ a)v0(w(1 − τ),h h)w




B : a(e)e v0(B,hs)+( 1− a(e))ˆ ae v0(B,hh)
−γ{a(e)+ˆ a(1 − a(e)) + (1 − a(e))(τwl+ B)
∂ˆ a
∂B
} =0 (5)Sickness absence and health care in an economic federation 9
e : −
⎡







−γ{(1 − ˆ a)(τwl+ B)a0(e)+1 } =0 .( 6 )
Note that the expression in curly brackets in equation (4), except B ∂ˆ a
∂τ,
multiplied with (1 − a(e)) represents the slope of the so called ‘Laﬀer curve’.10
Since v0(w(1 − τ),h h) > 0, (1 − a(e)) > 0 and B ∂ˆ a
∂τ > 0, equation (4) implies
that the tax revenue is a non-decreasing function of the tax rate in the unitary
solution. Throughout this paper, l0 is assumed to be strictly positive, stating
that the substitution eﬀect always dominates the income eﬀect.
Equation (5) shows that the marginal beneﬁt of consumption, for the average
person on sick leave, will be higher than the marginal cost of public funds. The
reason for this is that the government holds back the level of the sickness beneﬁt,
since it will aﬀect the fraction that works.
The ﬁrst row of equation (6) shows the marginal beneﬁt of expenditure on
health care. Since a fraction of those who will be treated will become mimickers,
the expression consists of a weighted sum of workers’ utility and mimickers’
utility, minus the utility of sick individuals. Throughout this paper, the utility
of the average healthy individual is assumed always to exceed the utility of a
sick individual. −(1−ˆ a)(τwl+ B)a0(e) is a ‘health budget feedback eﬀect’ that
shows the extra tax revenues and public savings that expenditure on health care
will cause. Let τ∗,B∗,e ∗, denote the second best tax and expenditure policies.11
10In addition to the standard terms in the Laﬀer curve, which describes the relationship
between tax revenues and the tax rate through the workers labor supply decision, the expres-
sion includes the term τwl∂ˆ a
∂τ, which multiplied with (1−a(e)) describes how the tax revenues
are aﬀected by the tax rate through its eﬀect on the number of workers.
11If mimickers were assigned the weight ζ, 0 ≤ ζ<1, in the social welfare function, this
would result in lower levels of τ∗,B∗,e ∗ compared to the case above, when the weight is unity.
This can be seen by inserting ζ before the mimickers’ utilities and marginal utilities in the
ﬁrst order conditions and adding the terms [ζ f V h
ˆ a −V h] ∂ˆ a
∂τ and [ζ f V h
ˆ a −V h] ∂ˆ a
∂B to equations (4)
and (5), respectively. Here f V h
ˆ a denotes the utility of the marginal mimicker. Since equation
(2) gives that f V h
ˆ a = V h, these new terms will be negative and therefore work for a lower tax
rate and a lower sickness beneﬁt. The latter would also be reduced compared to the case when
ζ =1 , since part of the utility of the beneﬁt goes to mimickers. Further, the government’s
incentive to cure individuals would be reduced, since some of the cured ones would become
mimickers.10 Sickness absence and health care in an economic federation
3 Decentralized policy decisions
This section begins with a description of the optimization problems facing the
state and federal governments, and then diﬀerent methods of implementing
the second best resource allocation are discussed. The decisions of the federal
government are important for all states and therefore the federal government
is assumed to act as a ﬁrst mover, committing to its policies before the states
and anticipating their eﬀects on the states’ decisions. The consequences for the
federal government of the actions taken by a single small state are minor and
the states are therefore assumed to act as Nash competitors towards it. As
mentioned, no interactions between the states are assumed to exist and hence
the states take the decisions by the other states as given.
3.1 The state governments
Since all states are identical, we can focus on a representative state. The state
government chooses t and e to maximize its objective function subject to its
budget constraint. The optimization problem can be written
Max




[e v(B,hh) − g(mi)]di
s.t.
(1 − a(e))(1 − ˆ a)twl − e =0 ,
where a(e), ˆ a and l are deﬁned above. The ﬁrst order conditions can be written
t : −(1 − ˆ a)v0(w(1 − t − T),h h)w













−γs{(1 − ˆ a)twla0(e)+1 } =0 ,
The decentralized solution is aﬀected correspondingly.Sickness absence and health care in an economic federation 11
where γs denotes the Lagrangian multiplier, which at the optimum can be
interpreted as the state’s perceived marginal cost of public funds.
Comparing these conditions with those for the unitary nation, we see that
they neglect the eﬀect that the policy decisions will have on the federal budget.
The tax externality works for a too high t and e if T>0 or B>0, but the
opposite is true for expenditure externality. Which eﬀe c tt h a td o m i n a t e si s
inconclusive, given the assumptions made. Even if the federal tax rate is zero,
the states may have suboptimal incentives since they neglect the eﬀect that
their decisions will have on the federal government’s expenditure for sickness
beneﬁt.
To determine under which conditions the state will have an incentive to
under- and over-provide health care, an expression for the vertical ﬁscal exter-
nality has to be derived. Given that the federal government’s budget constraint,
Rf,c a nb ew r i t t e n
Rf =( 1− a(e))(1 − ˆ a)Twl− (a(e)+ˆ a(1 − a(e)))B,( 7 )
















1+( 1− ˆ a)twla0(e)
(1 − a(e))
£




de originates from the state’s budget constraint. The ﬁr s tp a r to ft h e
equation describes the indirect eﬀect that the state’s health care expenditure
have on the federal budget constraint, through its relationship with the state’s
tax rate given by the state’s budget constraint. This indirect eﬀect works
through the eﬀect of the tax rate on the workers’ labor supply and the rate
of mimickers. The last term shows how the state’s health care expenditure in-
ﬂuence the federal budget constraint by changing the share of the population
that works and therefore not only altering the federal tax income but also the
federal government expenditure on sickness beneﬁt. A positive vertical ﬁscal ex-
ternality,
dRf
de > 0, means that the state will have an incentive to under-provide
health care.12 Sickness absence and health care in an economic federation
Given that the federal budget constraint can be written
(1 − s(e))Twl= s(e)B. (10)
and multiplying by de
dt gives us Proposition 1 below, where η =( ∂l/∂w)(w/l) is
the wage elasticity of the labor supply among workers and the term de
dt is the
inverse of equation (9). Given the states’ ﬁrst order conditions, de
dt is positive.
Proposition 1 In a decentralized setting where the state governments act as
Nash competitors and given any level of the federal government’s tax rate and
the sickness beneﬁt, the states will under-provide (over-provide) health care if
s(e)η +
1










The proposition shows that health care will be under-provided by the states
for any given level of B and T if the tax externality (the left hand side of equation
(11)) is dominated by the expenditure externality (the right hand side). That
is, health care will be under-provided if an increase in the states’ tax rates will
have a smaller impact on the federal government’s budget constraint than the
expenditure on health care that the tax increase can ﬁnance.
Proposition 1 shows that the less sensitive healthy individuals’ total labor
supply is to taxes, the more likely health care is to be under-provided by the
state government. The workers’ labor supply elasticity will be more important
the higher the fraction of individuals on sick leave. This may seem counter-
intuitive at ﬁrst, but is explained by the form of the federal governments’ budget
constraint. Equation (10) shows that a high value of s(e) implies that federal tax
revenues from a worker have to be large in comparison to the level of the sickness
beneﬁt. Therefore, changes in the labor supply will cause relatively large eﬀects
on the federal tax revenues. Other things being equal, health care is less likely
to be under-provided the higher the share of mimickers. The intuition is that if
a large share of the healthy individuals is represented by mimickers, the ﬁscal
reason for treating the sick becomes less important, reducing the expenditure
externality.12
Equation (11) can be rewritten using the state government’s decision rule.
Maximizing the state’s objective function with respect to e, and letting t be
12Proposition 1 holds even if the social weights assigned to the utilities of mimickers and
other groups are changed, since these not directly aﬀect the governments’ budget constraints.Sickness absence and health care in an economic federation 13















This allows equation (11) to be written as
s(e)η +
1
(1 − ˆ a)
∂ˆ a
∂t
< (>)(1 − ˆ a)
v0(w(1 − t − T),h h)w






The denominator of the right hand side of equation (13) shows the indirect
utilities for individuals in diﬀerent states. If the redistribution in the society is
extensive, the utility of sick individuals will approach the utility of the average
healthy individual. In this case, health care will be under-provided, since the
expression on the right hand side of equation (13) will approach inﬁnity. The
intuition is straight forward. If the average individual only experiences a very
little increase in utility by getting treated, there is little incentive for the state
to provide health care.
Before we continue to the federal level, it is helpful to analyze how the state
government will react to the federal government’s decisions. Below, I describe
h o wt h es t a t ew i l la l t e ri t se x p e n d i t u r eo nh e a l t hc a r ei nr e s p o n s et oc h a n g e so f
T and B, respectively, and letting the state’s tax rate be deﬁned subsequently
by its budget constraint. In order to do so, equation (12) is diﬀerentiated
with respect to e and T or B, holding the other federal governments’ policy




a0(e)(1 − ˆ a)v0w +( 1− a(e))(1 − ˆ a)v00w2 dt
de
+(1 − a(e))v0w dt
de
∂ˆ a















+(1 − a(e))v0w dt
de
∂ˆ a





where δ is the second derivative of the state’s optimization problem with respect
to e.
As will be demonstrated, both the numerators and the denominators of
equations (14) and (15) are negative, meaning that the state will react to an14 Sickness absence and health care in an economic federation
increased federal tax rate or sickness beneﬁt by reducing its expenditure on
health care.
The denominators, δ, are negative given that the state’s objective function
is concave in e.
The ﬁrst term in the numerator of equation (14) shows that an increased
federal tax rate will reduce the workers’ utility, reducing the state’s incentive to
cure sick individuals. The other terms demonstrate how the state’s perception
of the marginal costs of public funds is aﬀected by the federal tax rate. An
increased federal tax rate increases the workers’ marginal beneﬁt of income and
reduces the amount of health care that can be ﬁnanced by a given tax rate,
since it reduces the total number of hours worked. Both these eﬀects tend to
increase the state’s perception of the marginal costs of public funds when the
federal tax rate is increased. However, a higher federal tax rate also reduces
the number of workers that are aﬀected by the tax rate, by increasing the share
of mimickers. This eﬀect goes in the opposite direction to the other two. In
the appendix it is demonstrated that this eﬀect is dominated by the eﬀect that
works through changing the relation between t and e.
The ﬁrst term in the numerator of equation (15) shows that an increased
sickness beneﬁt will increase the utility of people on sick leave. This will reduce
the state’s incentive to cure sick individuals, if
∂h v(B,hs)
∂B > ˆ a
∂h v(B,hh)
∂B . This will
be the case unless consumption and health are suﬃciently strong complements,
and the number of mimickers is suﬃciently large. This is extremely unlikely
and the ﬁrst term will therefore be assumed to be negative.13 The other two
terms illustrate how the state’s perception of the marginal costs of public funds
is aﬀected by the sickness beneﬁt. As demonstrated in the appendix these terms
will be jointly negative.
To conclude, given the assumptions made, an increase in the federal tax
rate or the sickness beneﬁt reduces the state’s incentive to cure sick individuals
and increases its perception of the marginal costs of public funds, causing it to
13Empirical estimates reported in the literature indicate that consumption and health are
complements, but not strong enough to make the ﬁr s tt e r mi ne q u a t i o n( 1 5 )p o s i t i v e .V i s c u s i
and Evans (1990) estimate the marginal utility of consumption when ill to be 77.3 per cent of
that when well. The corresponding estimates reported in Gilleskie (1998) for acute illness are
58.2 and 15.6, depending on the type of illness. Since the rate of mimickers is indeed below
these ﬁgures, these estimates support the assumption that the ﬁr s tt e r mi ne q u a t i o n( 1 5 )i s
negative.Sickness absence and health care in an economic federation 15
reduce its expenditure on health care. Due to the balanced budget constraint,
this might imply a reduction of the state’s tax rate. However, a reduction of the
expenditure on health care does not by itself guarantee that the state’s tax rate
will also be reduced, since a change in anyone of the federal government’s policy
variables alters the relationship between the state’s policy variables. How the
state will adjust its tax rate, when the federal government changes its policy
choices, can be derived and interpreted in the same manner as for the state’s
adjustment of its expenditure on health care. In the appendix it is demonstrated
that dt
dT < 0 and dt
dB < 0.
3.2 The federal government
The federal government acts as a ﬁrst mover and chooses T and B to maximize
its objective function subject to its budget constraint, the private agents’ re-








[e v(B,hh) − g(mi)]di
s.t.
(1 − a(e))(1 − ˆ a)Twl− (a(e)+ˆ a(1 − a(e)))B =0 ,
where e = e(B,T), t = t(e(B,T),B,T) and where a(e), ˆ a and l are deﬁned
as before. Letting γf denote the Lagrangian multiplier, which at the optimum
can be interpreted as the federal government’s perceived marginal cost of public
funds, the federal government’s ﬁrst order conditions can be written
T : −(1 − a(e))(1 − ˆ a)v0(w(1 − t − T),h h)w
+γf(1 − a(e))
∙





B : a(e)e v0(B,hs)+( 1− a(e))ˆ ae v0(B,hh)
−γf
½




+ δB =0 ,16 Sickness absence and health care in an economic federation
where
δT =[ −(1 − a(e))(1 − ˆ a)v0w
+γf(1 − a(e))
∙












δB =[ −(1 − a(e))(1 − ˆ a)v0w
+γf(1 − a(e))
∙















(1 − ˆ a)(−tw2l0) − twl ∂ˆ a
∂T








(1 − ˆ a)(wl − tw2l0) − twl ∂ˆ a
∂t
> 0,
Z = −(1 − a(e))
∙






−(1 − ˆ a)(Twl+ B)a0(e).
Here, δT and δB represent the indirect eﬀects of the federal government’s de-
cision variables on the Lagrangian, via the reaction function for the states’
expenditure on health care and their budget constraints. The ﬁrst two rows in
the expressions for δT and δB, respectively, describe the eﬀect that the federal
government’s decision variables have on the Lagrangian through their eﬀects on
the state’s tax bases. These terms work in favor of lower T and B, respectively,
since this will reduce the states’ tax rates for any given level of e. Z relates to
the vertical externality facing the state governments, described in equation (8).
If the states have an incentive to under-provide health care, Z will be positive,
working in favor of lower T and B,a n dv i c ev e r s a .
A special case appears when the tax and expenditure externalities described
in equation (8) compensate each other exactly. Z will then equal zero and
the ﬁrst order conditions will be identical to the ﬁrst order conditions for theSickness absence and health care in an economic federation 17
unitary nation.14 In this case the federal government has enough instruments
at its disposal to obtain the unitary nation optimum. By setting B = B∗ the
federal government will induce the state governments to set e = e∗ and the
budget constraints gives (t + T)=τ∗.
In general, the externalities facing the state governments will not cancel out
and the federal government will not be able to simultaneously achieve both B∗
and e∗,g i v e nt h a tB and T are its only two policy variables. Instead, the federal
government is left to choose a point on the state governments’ reaction functions.
The diﬀerent situations are illustrated in Figure 1, where the problem is reduced
to the state governments choosing e and the federal government choosing B,
letting t and T be deﬁned subsequently by the respective budget constraints.
Z<0 and Z>0 illustrate what the states’ reaction functions can look like
if the states have an incentive to over-provide and under-provide health care,
respectively. Z =0is an illustration of the case where the tax- and expenditure
externalities cancel out exactly. U1 and U2 (U1 <U 2) illustrate what the federal
government’s indiﬀerence curves in the B − e plane might look like given the
relationship between these variables and the tax rates.
Figure 1 illustrates a setting where the federal government will choose a point
in the North East quadrant if the states have incentives to over-provide health
care. By setting B above B∗ the federal government has induced the states to
reduce their expenditure on health care compared to point 1. However, e is still
above e∗ and the total tax rate exceeds that of the unitary solution.
Given the general form of the model, we can not conclude that the solution
will be in this quadrant. If the high state tax rates, associated with high ex-
penditure on health care, result in suﬃciently high social cost for ﬁnancing the
sickness beneﬁt and if the slope of the states’ reaction functions is suﬃciently
ﬂat, the federal government will choose a point in the North West quadrant. In
t h eo p p o s i t ec a s et h ef e d e r a lg o v e r n m e n tw i l lc h o o s eap o i n ti nt h eS o u t hE a s t
quadrant, which means that, by selecting a high enough sickness beneﬁt, it will
induce the states to choose e below e∗, despite their incentives to choose a too
high level of e for any given level of B.
14To see this, use that ∂ˆ a
∂t = ∂ˆ a
∂T , insert the expressions for dt
dT |de=0 and dt
dB|de=0, respec-
tively, in the ﬁrst order conditions and rearrange.18 Sickness absence and health care in an economic federation
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Figure 1. Illustration of possible solutions in the decentralized setting
If the states have incentives to under-provide health care, the federal govern-
ment might choose a point in the South West quadrant, as illustrated in Figure
1. This case illustrates a situation where the federal government has induced
the states to increase their expenditure on health care, compared to point 2,
by reducing the sickness beneﬁt. If the low state tax rates, associated with low
expenditure on health care, result in suﬃciently low social cost for ﬁnancing the
sickness beneﬁt and the slope of the states’ reaction functions is suﬃciently ﬂat,
the federal government will choose a point in the South East quadrant. Low
state tax rates could reduce the social cost of ﬁnancing the sickness beneﬁtb y
reducing the share of mimickers and the workers’ marginal beneﬁto fi n c o m e ,
and by increasing the number of hours each worker supplies. However, low ex-
penditure on health care implies a high share of the population being absent
from work due to illness, which increases the social cost of ﬁnancing the sickness
beneﬁt. If this eﬀect is strong enough and the slope of the states’ reaction func-
tions is steep enough, the federal government might end up choosing a pointSickness absence and health care in an economic federation 19
in the North West quadrant, which means that e will be above e∗, despite the
states having incentives to under-provide health care for any given level of B.
To conclude, given the general form of the model we can not determine how
the level of health care provided in the decentralized setting will be in relation to
the second best level, except when the externalities facing the state governments
cancel out exactly. Whether health care will be under- or over-provided in the
other situations depends not only on the sign of the ﬁscal externality facing the
states, but also on the social costs of ﬁnancing the sickness beneﬁt, which aﬀects
the form of the federal government’s indiﬀerence curves, and on the slope of the
states’ reaction functions.
3.3 Implementing the second best solution
This section examines diﬀerent ways that the unitary nation optimum can be
achieved by changing the governments’ responsibilities or policy instruments.
A self-evident solution is to abolish the federal structure, either by transferring
the responsibility of providing health care to the federal level or by transferring
the responsibility of providing the sickness beneﬁt to the state level. In this
model these two solutions will be equally eﬀective, but in reality both solutions
might be unfeasible for constitutional, political or other reasons not accounted
for in the model.
It is also possible to implement the second best solution while retaining the
federal structure. If the federal government is given the possibility of deciding
a positive or negative intergovernmental transfer, R, the state and the federal
governments’ budget constraints become
(1 − a(e))(1 − ˆ a)twl − e + R =0 (16)
and
(1 − a(e))(1 − ˆ a)Twl− (a(e)+ˆ a(1 − a(e)))B − R =0 ,
respectively. The federal government now has three policy instruments at its
disposal, T, B and R. It can observe the true marginal cost of public funds
and the preference of the individuals and is therefore able to set B = B∗.T h e
federal government is also able to observe the optimal value of τ and to design
the intergovernmental transfer so that the state governments will internalize the20 Sickness absence and health care in an economic federation
eﬀects that their decisions have on the federal government. This is described in
Proposition 2.
Proposition 2 If the federal government remits all its tax revenues back to the
states, but makes each state transfer back an amount equal to the expenditure on
the optimal sickness beneﬁt in that state, then t = τ∗ − T and e = e∗ will solve
the state governments’ optimization problem. The intergovernmental transfer
can be written as
R =( 1− a(e))(1 − ˆ a)(Twl+ B∗) − B∗, (17)
where (1 − a(e))(1 − ˆ a) is the share of workers, Twl is the federal tax income
p e rw o r k e ra n dB∗ is the optimal sickness beneﬁt.15
Proof. By substituting equation (17) into equation (16) the states optimization
problem becomes
Max





(1 − a(e))(1 − ˆ a)twl − e +( 1− a(e))(1 − ˆ a)(Twl+ B∗) − B∗ =0 ,
where a(e), ˆ a and l are deﬁned as before. The Lagrangian is written




[e v(B,hh) − g(mi)]di
+γs{(1 − a(e))(1 − ˆ a)(t + T)wl − (a(e)+ˆ a(1 − a(e)))B∗ − e}.
Since τ = t + T by deﬁnition, this Lagrangian is identical with that for the
social optimization problem in subsection 2.1.
The fact that T can be set at any level is a result of t and T entering ad-
ditively in the individuals’ utility functions. The choice of T will not aﬀect the
15Aronsson and Wikström (2003) derived a similar result, in the context of risk-sharing in
an economic federation.Sickness absence and health care in an economic federation 21
policy rule, as such, but the size of the intergovernmental transfer. That is, T
is a superﬂuous policy instrument. However, if the tax rates are constrained
to be non-negative, T must be 0 ≤ T ≤ τ∗. To understand why the transfer
will make the externalities facing the states vanish, notice that equation (17) is
identical with the federal government’s budget constraint without an intergov-
ernmental transfer, equation (7), when B = B∗. Therefore, the states will take
the same decisions as they would have taken if they directly took the eﬀect of
their decisions on the federal government’s budget constraint into account.
A special case is when T =0 , which allows the transfer to be written
R = −(a(e)+ˆ a(1 − a(e)))B∗. (18)
The transfer will in this case be negative and equal to the expenditure on the
optimal sickness beneﬁt in each state. The size of the negative transfer depends
on each state’s decisions regarding e and t and not only has the objective to
ﬁnance the federal government’s expenditure on the sickness beneﬁt, but also
to correct the states’ incentives. This result diﬀers from that presented by for
example Boadway and Keen (1996). They claim that if all rents and tax powers
are allocated to the states, the vertical externality will vanish and the sole
objective of the transfer will be to ﬁnance the federal expenditure. The diﬀerent
result is caused here by the fact that the federal government has at its disposal
a redistributive policy instrument, B, which was not present in Boadway and
Keen (1996), and the fact that the need for redistribution is directly aﬀected
by the decisions taken by the states.
Moral hazard among individuals (captured by the parameter ˆ a)d o e sn o t
aﬀect the diﬀerent ways the second best solution can be implemented, but does
aﬀect the size of the optimal transfers. This can be seen in equations (17) and
(18).16
4 Discussion
This paper addresses provision of health care and redistribution, in terms of a
sickness beneﬁt, in an economic federation. The analysis is based on a model
16Similarly, Proposition 2 holds even if mimickers’ utilities are assigned a lower social weight,
but the size of the optimal transfers would be aﬀected since this would aﬀect the values of
the parameters.22 Sickness absence and health care in an economic federation
where the state governments provide health care and the federal government
provides a sickness beneﬁt and both levels of government tax labor income.
The results show that the states can either have an incentive to under-
or over-provide health care. The federal government can induce the states to
increase (reduce) their expenditure on health care, by reducing (increasing)
the sickness beneﬁt and the federal tax rate. The results also demonstrate
that the federal government can induce the state governments to internalize
the eﬀects that their decisions will have on the federal government’s budget
constraint. This can be done by introducing an intergovernmental transfer,
where the federal government remits all its tax revenues to the states, but makes
each state transfer back an amount equal to the expenditure for the optimal
sickness beneﬁt in that state. In this model, the vertical ﬁscal externality will
not vanish even if all powers of taxation are assigned to the states. This result
diﬀers from previous ones presented in the literature and is caused by the fact
that the states’ decisions in this model directly aﬀect the federal government’s
expenditure.
The results from this paper can be generalized to other state ﬁnanced pro-
grams that reduce the number who receive federal transfers, for example labor
market programs, and may inform policy makers on how to reduce the misallo-
cation of resources associated with such programs.
One important assumption in the paper is that no horizontal externalities
exist. In reality, labor mobility will give rise to horizontal externalities. If labor
is mobile, expenditure on health care in a state may attract sick individuals
to that state and discourage workers, due to the higher tax rate necessary for
ﬁnancing the increased expenditure. Other states will therefore beneﬁtf r o ma
state’s increased expenditure, which implies that labor mobility gives rise to a
positive horizontal externality.17 Including these positive horizontal externali-
ties in the analysis would therefore increase the probability of health care being
under-provided in the decentralized setting, but it will not change the way the
federal government can inﬂuence the states’ decisions and the general result that
the unitary nation optimum can be implemented through an intergovernmental
transfer.
17The possibility of patients seeking treatment in another state than that of resident, will
also cause a horizontal externality, if the state of resident does not have to fully reimburse
the state which treated the patient.Sickness absence and health care in an economic federation 23
Appendix
Deﬁne
F =[ 1+( 1− ˆ a)twla0(e)],
G =( 1− a(e))
∙




and note, by comparing with equation (9), that F
G = dt
de.U s i n gt h e s ed e ﬁnitions,








twla0(e) − (1 − ˆ a)a0(e)tw2l0
¸










By substituting equation (19) into equation (14) and rearranging, the latter




a0(e)(1 − ˆ a)v0w +( 1− a(e))(1 − ˆ a)v00w2 dt
de
+(1 − a(e))v0w/G ∂ˆ a




+(1 − a(e))(1 − ˆ a)v0w{(1 − ˆ a)a0(e)tw2l0/G
+F(1 − a(e))
h
(1 − ˆ a)(−w2l0 + tw3l00) − twl ∂2ˆ a







The terms in the four last rows in the numerator of equation (20) describe
how the state’s perception of the marginal cost of public funds is aﬀected by
the federal tax rate, through its eﬀect on the share of workers in the population
and its eﬀect on the relationship between t and e. As will be demonstrated,
these four rows are jointly negative given the assumptions made. G and F
are positive according to the state’s ﬁrst order condition. The quotient in the
third row is larger than one, which guarantees that the second and third rows
are jointly negative. In the ﬁfth row, the term tw2l0 ∂ˆ a
∂t is dominated by the
term −(1 − ˆ a)w2l0, since the assumption that the state’s tax revenue is strictly
increasing in its tax rate, requires that t∂ˆ a
∂t < (1−ˆ a). This guarantees also that
the fourth and ﬁfth rows are jointly negative.24 Sickness absence and health care in an economic federation
















By substituting equation (21) into equation (15) and rearranging, the latter











+(1 − a(e))v0w/G ∂ˆ a








The terms in the last three rows in the numerator of equation (22) describe how
the state’s perception of the marginal costs of public funds is aﬀected by the
sickness beneﬁt. Given the assumptions made, these terms are jointly negative
for the same reason as described above.
dt
dT and dt
dB can be derived in a similar manner. Maximizing the states’ ob-
jective functions with respect to t, letting the state’s expenditure on health care
be deﬁned subsequently by its budget constraint, gives the ﬁrst order condition
−
⎡









−(1−a(e))(1−ˆ a)v0(w(1−t−T),h h)w =0 .
(23)




a0(e)(1 − ˆ a)v0w de
dt −
"














ζ is the diﬀerential of equation (23) with respect to t and is therefore negative,
given that the state’s objective function is concave in t.T h eﬁrst term in the
numerator of equation (24) shows that an increased federal tax rate will reduce
the workers utility, reducing the state’s incentive to raise taxes to ﬁnance the
treatment of sick individuals. The second term demonstrates that this incentiveSickness absence and health care in an economic federation 25
is further reduced by the fact that an increased federal tax rate reduces the
total number of hours worked, reducing the amount of health care that can be
ﬁnanced by a given state tax. Further more, an increased federal tax rate will
increase the workers marginal beneﬁt of income, increasing the social cost of
raising the taxes. The fourth term shows that the social cost of raising taxes
is reduced by the fact that an increased federal tax rate reduces the number of
workers that are aﬀected by the tax rate. By substituting equation (25)
∂(de/dt)
∂T













twla0(e)+G(1 − ˆ a)tw2l0a0(e)}/F2 (25)
into equation (24) and rearranging using equation (23), it can be seen below




a0(e)(1 − ˆ a)v0w de
dt +( 1− a(e))(1 − ˆ a)v00w2
−a0(e)
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(1 − ˆ a)(−w2l0 + tw3l00) − twl ∂2ˆ a
∂t∂T + tw2l0 ∂ˆ a
∂t
i
+G(1 − ˆ a)tw2l0a0(e)}/F2
+(1 − a(e))v0w ∂ˆ a
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h
































The ﬁrst term in the numerator of equation (26) shows that an increased sickness
beneﬁt will increase the utility of people on sick leave. Given the assumption
stated in Section 3.1, this will reduce the state’s incentive to raise taxes to
ﬁnance health care. The second term demonstrates that this incentive is further
reduced by the fact that a higher sickness beneﬁt reduces the total number of26 Sickness absence and health care in an economic federation
hours worked, reducing the amount of health care that can be ﬁnanced by a
given state tax rate. The last term shows that the social cost of raising taxes
is reduced by the fact that an increased sickness beneﬁt reduces the number of
workers that are aﬀected by the tax rate. By substituting equation (27)
∂(de/dt)
∂B












into equation (26) and rearranging using equation (23), it can be seen below





















(1 − a(e))twl ∂2ˆ a
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+(1 − a(e))v0w/F ∂ˆ a
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h
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Based on data from a panel of the Swedish municipalities during 1993-
2004, the eﬀects of public health care expenditure on absence from work
due to sickness or disability were studied using an instrumental variable
m e t h o d .P u b l i ch e a l t hc a r ee x p e n d i t u r eh a dn os i g n i ﬁcant eﬀect on ab-
sence due to sickness or disability and the standard errors were small
enough to rule out all but a minimal eﬀect. The same result was obtained
when separate estimates were done for men and women and for absence
due to sickness and disability.
Key words: health care expenditure; sick leave; disability; worker ab-
senteeism; dynamic panel data models; endogeneity
JEL classiﬁcation: H51; I12; J22
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1I n t r o d u c t i o n
Rising health care costs in most industrialized countries have increased the
importance of evaluating the eﬀects of health care expenditure. In the past few
decades, assessing its eﬀects on health outcomes has become a central question in
the context of health care cost containment in most developed countries (Nixon
and Ulmann, 2006). From a Swedish perspective it is especially interesting
to estimate the relationship between health care expenditure and absenteeism,
since according to OECD (2005) “Sweden’s single biggest economic problem is
the high number of people absent from work due to sickness or disability”.1
The eﬀects of health care programs on the absence of speciﬁc patient groups
have been studied previously.2 However, to my knowledge, the eﬀect of aggre-
gated health care expenditure on absence has never been studied. The purpose
of the present study was to estimate how aggregated public expenditure on
health care aﬀects absence from work due to sickness or disability.
The literature on absence includes estimations of the eﬀects of individuals’
health status: Paringer (1983) found perceived health status to be an important
predictor of hours lost from work, which was supported by Primoﬀ Vistnes
(1997), who also reported statistically signiﬁcant eﬀects of obesity and smoking
on the likelihood for women’s absence. The literature also provides massive
support for that economic incentives aﬀect absence, for example the following
four studies using Swedish data; Johansson and Brännäs (1998), Johansson and
Palme (2002, 2005); Henrekson and Persson (2004).3
Whether increased aggregated expenditure on health care or increased access
to health care actually improves the health status of the population in indus-
trialized countries is still an open question. Higher expenditure on health care
could lead to better health among the population by reducing waiting times for
medical care or improving procedures. But according to Nixon and Ulmann’s
(2006) review of the literature on health care expenditures and health outcomes,
cross-country studies have found limited or no relationship between health care
expenditure and mortality rates. On the other hand, Crémieux et al. (1999)
1According to Statistics Sweden and The Swedish Social Insurance Agency, 5.2 percent
of employee working hours in Sweden were lost due to sickness absence in 2004; at the same
time 8.1 percent of the population aged 16 to 64 were on disability pension.
2Absence will be used throughout this paper to mean absence from work due to either
sickness or disability.
3Brown and Sessions (1996) review the literature on absence more broadly.2 The Eﬀect of Health Care Expenditure on Sickness Absence
found that higher health care expenditure among Canadian provinces reduced
male and female infant mortality and increased life expectancy. They explained
the diﬀerent results by the inherent heterogeneity associated with cross-country
studies. Lichtenberg (2004) analyzed time-series of life expectancy in the United
States and found that both public health care expenditure and research and de-
velopment expenditure on pharmaceuticals had positive eﬀects. Aakvik and
Holmås (2006) found no eﬀect of the total number of general practitioners per
capita on mortality rates in Norwegian municipalities, but found a negative
eﬀect of the number of contracted general practitioners. Brook et al. (1983)
reported on the Rand Health Insurance Experiment, a controlled trial in the
United States where families were randomly assigned insurance plans. One
group received all their medical care free of charge and, as a consequence, used
more than the other groups. Despite this, the only statistically signiﬁcant ef-
fects were improvements in health for those with poor vision and for low-income
persons with high blood pressure. However, the study included only people aged
14 to 61 who were free of disability that precluded work.
Except for the rare occasions when a randomized controlled trial is pre-
formed, determining the eﬀect of health care expenditure and access to health
care is complicated by the context in which decisions regarding health care are
taken. Health care expenditure is partly determined by the perceived need for
it, which in turn may be aﬀected by absence. Therefore an instrumental vari-
able estimator was used in this study in an attempt to determine the causal
link between health care expenditure and absence.
Most previous studies have evaluated the eﬀect of health care expenditure
on mortality rates and life expectancy. Therefore, this paper contributes to
the literature by examining the eﬀect on absence due to sickness or disability,
which can be expected to be correlated with individuals’ health related quality
of life. The analysis was based on municipality-level data from Sweden. As
demonstrated by Granlund (2007), the results may also help determining the
sign of a vertical ﬁscal externality that arises when a lower level of government
provides health care, the central government provides a sickness beneﬁta n d
both levels tax labor income. Health care is more likely to be over-provided by
the local governments the smaller eﬀect health care expenditure has on absence.
The article also explains why the lower level of government has a weak incentive
to reduce absence. In practice, this may result in a relatively small share ofThe Eﬀect of Health Care Expenditure on Sickness Absence 3
total health care expenditure being focused on reducing absence in a country
like Sweden. The results from research in this ﬁeld may also inform policy
makers in their decision regarding the level of expenditure on health care. The
main ﬁnding in this paper is that health care expenditure had no statistically
signiﬁcant eﬀect on absence and that, under all circumstances, the possible
eﬀect was small.
The next section outlines the theory, while section 3 presents the empirical
analysis. The data are discussed in section 3.1 and the empirical speciﬁcation
in section 3.2, while section 3.3 contains the results. Finally, in section 4 the
paper’s conclusions are presented.
2T h e o r e t i c a l o u t l i n e
To later be able to specify the empirical model, we need an absence function for
municipalities which includes the health status of the population as well as a
health production function. To derive the ﬁrst of these, we ﬁrst have to analyze
what determines whether individuals will prefer to be absent from work.
An individual’s instantaneous utility can be expressed as ut = u(ct) −
f(ht,j t)−g(si,t−1,s −i,t−1),w h e r ect is consumption at time t;e ﬀort (f) depends
on health status (ht) and work conditions (jt); and the disutility of absence (−g)
depends on one’s own prior period absence (si,t−1) and that of others (s−i,t−1).
It is assumed that eﬀort decreases with good health and work conditions, while
the disutility of absence decreases with both one’s own and others’ prior pe-
riod absence. This represents internal habit formation, that one might be more
likely to be absent this period for a given health and other variables if one was
absent the last period, and external habit formation, that high previous absence
of others in one’s surroundings might reduce the social cost of current absence.
Naturally, for absent individuals the eﬀo r ti sz e r oa n df o rt h o s ew o r k i n gt h e
disutility of absence is zero.
For simplicity let’s assume that individuals have no access to capital markets
and only choose whether to work or be absent. When an individual works
ct = wt(1−τt),w h e r ew is labor income and τ is the tax rate on labor income.
For individuals absent from work ct = Bt(1−τt),w h e r eB is a sickness beneﬁt.
Assuming myopic behavior, i.e. that individuals neglect the eﬀect of current4 The Eﬀect of Health Care Expenditure on Sickness Absence
absence on their future utility, individual’s will prefer to be absent if
u(Bt(1 − τt)) − g(si,t−1,s −i,t−1) >u (wt(1 − τt)) − f(ht,j t).( 1 )
Medical doctors and sickness insurance oﬃcials are usually involved in de-
ciding whether a sickness beneﬁt will be allowed. According to the Swedish
regulations during the study-period, individuals were entitled to sickness bene-
ﬁts if their capacity to work was suﬃciently reduced due to poor health and a
doctor’s certiﬁcate was usually required for sick leave extending one week.4 For
long-term sick leave, the capacity to perform other assignments would also be
taken into consideration.5 Nevertheless, also the variables B, τ, si,t−1, s−i,t−1
and w can be expected to aﬀect absence. First, since doctors and insurance
oﬃcials cannot observe ability to work perfectly, they must rely in part on in-
formation provided by the individual, which may be aﬀected by the individual’s
incentives. Second, doctors may also consider what their patients prefer, and
while insurance oﬃcials can deny sickness beneﬁts to individuals with a doc-
tor’s certiﬁcate, they mostly follow the doctor’s recommendation.6 The absence
function for municipalities can therefore be written
st = s(Bt(1 − τt),wt(1 − τt),st−1,jt,ht),( 2 )
where B,τ,w,s,j,h are in bold to indicate that they describe the situation for
all individuals of working age in a municipality.
The aggregated health status in a municipality at period t can be written
ht=h(ht−1,et,rt,Xt),( 3 )
where e is public health care expenditure per capita; r represents the health
risks that individuals are exposed to, for example at their workplaces; and X
denotes demographic characteristics, like age and gender.
4Since October 1, 1995, a doctor’s certiﬁcate has been required to receive beneﬁts after
the seventh calendar day of absence. Before that, the Swedish Social Insurance Agency could
require a doctor’s certiﬁcate for sick leave lasting over four weeks, and also earlier in some
cases (Proposition 1994/95:147; Lag 1962:381).
5In certain circumstances, also the individual’s age and education etc. were allowed to
inﬂuence the judgment regarding capacity to work (Lag 1962:381).
6Blomqvist (1991) and Shortell (1998) discussed physicians multiple accountabilities.
Based on a survey of 4,200 physicians active in Sweden (response rate 58 percent), Arrelöv
(2006) similarly reports that 65 percent of physicians consider the patient’s motivation for
returning to work when assessing the extent of allowable sick leave.The Eﬀect of Health Care Expenditure on Sickness Absence 5
3 Empirical analysis
3.1 Data description
The present study was based on yearly municipality-level data on absence for
the period 1993 to 2004. There were 286 municipalities in 1993, yielding 3,432
observations.7 Data on public health care expenditure are primarily available
at county level, where responsibility for health care provision lies. There were
23 counties in 1993, shrinking to 20 in 2004. In addition there were three
municipalities (Malmö, Göteborg and Gotland) which did not belong to any
county but provided health care themselves in 1993. By 2004 only Gotland
remained in this category.
Table 1 (below) gives descriptive statistics of the variables used in this study
while Table A1 in Appendix A deﬁnes them and gives data sources. Figure 1 and
2 (also in Appendix A) provide box plots for two of the most central variables
in this study. The ﬁrst six variables describe absence from work and cover
all employees and self-employed in Sweden, since they were all automatically
i n s u r e di nt h es o c i a li n s u r a n c es y s t e m .Sickness is the average number of days
of absence from work due to sickness during a year for insured individuals in the
ages of 16 to 64. Disability and Rehab are the corresponding numbers of days
on disability/early retirement pension and days of absence due to rehabilitation,
respectively, and absence, s, is the sum of these three variables. The original
absence data lacked information for some observations and did not include days
compensated by employers, which over the study-period changed between the
ﬁrst 14, 21, and 28 days of each absence spell. In Appendix B it is described
how data from other sources were used to adjust the absence variables to always
correspond to absence from the 15th day of each spell, as well as how missing
data in these variables were handled.
The most common reasons for both sickness and disability absence were ill-
ness in locomotion organs and mental illness. Those whose capacity to work
was expected to be suﬃciently reduced for a long time could receive disabil-
ity/early retirement pension, usually preceded by a long period of sick leave
(Riksförsäkringsverket, 2004; Lag 1962:381). During the study-period, the com-
pensation levels in the social insurance system ranged from 75 to 90 percent of
7By 2004 there were 290 municipalities, but data from the new municipalities were aggre-
gated according to 1993 boundaries.6 The Eﬀect of Health Care Expenditure on Sickness Absence
the income from the second day of absence, but with a cap at a certain level of
income. At ﬁrst less than 10 percent of the insured were aﬀected by this cap,
but by 2004 22 percent were (Henrekson and Persson, 2004; the Swedish Social
Insurance Agency).
Public health care expenditure (e)w a sd e ﬁn e da se a c hc o u n t y ’ sp e rc a p i t a
operating costs on health care, excluding expenditure on dental care and phar-
maceuticals. Of this roughly 2 percent was patients’ co-payments for public
health care. During the study-period total health care expenditure constituted
7.5-8.5 percent of Sweden’s GDP, of which 11-15 percent was for pharmaceu-
ticals and 8-10 percent for dental care. Pharmaceuticals were excluded from
the study because they were paid by the central government until 1998, and
dental care was excluded since it might have a quite diﬀerent eﬀect on absence
compared to other health care services. Public expenditure accounted for ap-
proximately 95 percent of the total non-dental, non-pharmaceutical health care
expenditure in Sweden (Socialstyrelsen, 2006). The variable (e)o fc o u r s ei n -
cludes expenditure on the entire population (not just those of working age), but
adjustments for variations in county age-composition were made using micro-
data of health care consumption. Appendix C describes how this was done in
order to create a variable describing age-adjusted per capita public health care
expenditure, denoted eadj.
w is the average labor income of the non-absent population of working age
(16 to 64 years of age) in each municipality. τM and τC are the proportional
municipality and county income tax rates, respectively, and τMC is the sum of
them.
The variables Women to Pop6064 describe the shares in the population of
working age which belong to each demographic group. El.School, HighSchool
and University denote the shares of the working age population with diﬀerent
educational levels, described in Table A1 in Appendix A. SocM and SocC
denote the fraction of each municipality and county parliament, respectively,
represented by socialist parties. Finally, PolmajM and PolmajC are dummy
variables which take the value 1 if either one of the two traditional Swedish
political blocks has own majority in the municipality and county parliament,
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Table 1. Descriptive statistics
1994∗∗ 2004 1993-2004
Variable Mean Std.dv. Mean Std.dv. Mean Std.dv.
Sickness 10.46 1.84 15.55 3.30 13.44 4.08
Disability 29.08 8.06 31.26 7.20 28.72 7.40
Rehab 1.18 0.49 1.01 0.46 0.89 0.45
s 40.72 9.23 47.82 9.14 43.05 9.55
swomen 45.97 10.06 58.39 11.00 51.18 11.50
smen 35.97 9.02 37.88 8.20 36.03 8.44
e∗ 10.84 1.25 15.76 0.92 12.86 2.11
eadj∗ 10.68 1.02 15.56 0.81 12.72 2.04
w 159.70 18.25 215.62 23.65 186.39 29.58
τm 19.24 1.80 21.45 1.26 20.70 1.72
τc∗ 11.09 1.34 10.43 0.68 10.24 1.11
τmc 30.34 1.12 31.84 0.91 30.94 1.21
Women 0.49 0.01 0.49 0.01 0.49 0.01
Pop1639 0.50 0.02 0.45 0.04 0.47 0.04
Pop4049 0.24 0.01 0.21 0.01 0.23 0.02
Pop5054 0.10 0.01 0.11 0.01 0.12 0.01
Pop5559 0.08 0.01 0.13 0.01 0.10 0.02
Pop6064 0.08 0.01 0.10 0.01 0.09 0.01
El.School 0.33 0.06 0.25 0.04 0.30 0.06
HighSchool 0.59 0.03 0.63 0.03 0.61 0.04
University 0.07 0.04 0.12 0.05 0.09 0.05
SocM 0.51 0.12 0.47 0.11 0.48 0.12
SocC∗ 0.45 0.07 0.49 0.04 0.50 0.06
PolmajM 0.73 0.47 0.71 0.45 0.72 0.45
PolmajC∗ 0.93 0.24 0.44 0.50 0.66 0.48
∗Indicates that the variable is measured at county-level instead of municipality-level.
∗∗ Descriptive statistics are reported for 1994 since data on swomen and smen were
not available for 1993.8 The Eﬀect of Health Care Expenditure on Sickness Absence
3.2 Empirical speciﬁcation
The empirical speciﬁcation of the municipal absence function, i.e. equation (2),
can be written





ηlEdulit + β3hit + yt + µi + εit.( 4 )
wit(1 − τmc
it ), the net labor income in municipality i at time t,w a si n c l u d e dt o
capture the monetary incentive of remaining at work for the marginal worker.
In equation (2) absence was also aﬀected by the sickness beneﬁtn e to ft a x e s ,
but this was left out from the speciﬁcation since sickness beneﬁts are a function
of labor income and since observed values of it to a higher degree than the
observed values of w depend on the composition of those on absence. Hence, a
relatively high fraction of the variation in B does not correspond with variation
in the monetary incentives to remain at work for the marginal worker.
The educational variables, Edul, (l =1 ,2), were used as proxies for work
conditions. These variables may also capture the eﬀect caused by that em-
ployment contracts diﬀer among diﬀerent type of jobs in respect to stipulated
number of hours and ﬂexible hours. Eﬀects of contracts have been highlighted as
major explanations to absence in previous economic literature (see e.g. Brown
and Sessions, 1996). Year-speciﬁc ﬁxed eﬀects (yt)w e r ei n c l u d e dt oc a p t u r e
“national variables” such as business cycle eﬀects on absence. Municipality-
speciﬁc ﬁxed eﬀects (µi) were included to capture time invariant heterogeneity
among the municipalities which might be correlated with the regressors. The
other two variables, st−1 and h, were motivated in the theoretical outline.
The empirical speciﬁcation of the municipal health production function, i.e.
equation (3), can be written










κnPopnit + γ3Womenit − δt,( 5 )
where ht−1 denotes lagged health status and eadj is age-adjusted health care
expenditure. Since lagged health status was included as an explanatory variable,The Eﬀect of Health Care Expenditure on Sickness Absence 9
the purpose of the other explanatory variables was to capture changes in the
health status, rather than the level of it. As such, Edul, (l =1 ,2) were used
as proxies for the health risks that people in the municipalities are exposed to
during the year at their work place. ∆Popnt = Pop nt −Popn,t−1, (n =1 ,2...4)
describe the change in the age-composition of the population in working age,
whereas Popn, (n =1 ,2...4) and Womendescribe the demographic composition
of the population in working age. The demographic variables might enter the
equation in diﬀerences since demographic groups might diﬀer in health status
and that changes in these variables therefore lead to changes in the population’s
health status. Demographic variables might enter in levels since demographic
groups might have diﬀerent development of their health status over time.8 δ
denotes depreciation of the health status and was allowed to vary over time but
not over municipalities. Not allowing the depreciation of the health status to
vary over municipalities in other ways than that captured by the demographic
and the educational variables was of course a restriction. This restriction was
imposed since health status is hard to measure and that it therefore is diﬃcult
to estimate how the depreciation depends on the level of this variable.
Diﬀerentiating equation (5) and substituting it into a diﬀerentiated version
of equation (4) yields















κnPopnit + γ3Womenit} + Yt + ∆εit,( 6 )
where Yt = yt−yt−1−β3δt. This equation, on which all empirical speciﬁcations
will be based, shows how the eﬀect of health care expenditure on absence can
be estimated without having to include proxies for health status. The new error
term, ∆εt = εt −εt−1, is by construction correlated with the lagged dependent
variable, ∆st−1 = st−1 − st−2, which is then endogenous. Also expenditure
on health care might be endogenous since, ceteris paribus, an increase in ab-
sence might cause the counties to increase it. Beyond that, a negative health
8∆WomenWA was left out since it is has no statistically signiﬁcant eﬀect on absence.10 The Eﬀect of Health Care Expenditure on Sickness Absence
shock, not captured by any of the other explanatory variables of equation (6),
might cause an increase in both absence and health care expenditure. However,
the endogeneity problem is probably reduced since the dependent variable was
measured at the municipal level, whereas health care expenditure was decided
at the county level. Since county tax revenue was used to ﬁnance health care
the tax rate might also be endogenous, and if the labor income of the marginal
non-absent individual diﬀers from the average labor income of the non-absent
population, w will be endogenous as well.
The endogeneity problem was addressed by instrumenting ∆st−1, eadj and
∆(w(1 − τmc)) with the closest lags uncorrelated with the new error term,
namely ∆st−2, eadjt−1,a n d∆(wt−2(1 −τmc
t−2));a n d∆PolmajM, ∆PolmajC,
∆SocM,a n d∆SocC were included as additional instruments.9,10 These four
last instruments are expected to correlate with the tax and expenditure deci-
sions of the municipal and county governments and were primarily included to
avoid problems with weak instruments for ∆(w(1−τmc));b u t∆PolmajC and
∆SocC could also be expected to strengthen the instrument set for health care
expenditure.11
Based on the theoretical outline it is reasonable to expect ∆(w(1−τmc)) to
have a negative impact on absence. Descriptive statistics from Sweden states
that younger and better educated individuals were less likely to be absent, which
formed my expectation about the coeﬃcients for the diﬀerenced educational and
demographic variables. During the period under study, absence has increased
much more for women than for men, more for individuals aged 50 to 59 than for
others and the absence has decrease for individuals aged 60 to 64. This formed
my expectations for the coeﬃcient for Womenand the three highest age-groups
in levels, whereas I had no prior expectation regarding the remaining age-group
and Edul , (l =1 ,2). Previous absence was expected to have a positive inﬂuence
on current absence, as explained in the theoretical outline. Lastly, public health
care expenditure was anticipated to have negative or no impact on absence. As
9These instruments will be uncorrelated with the new error term if εt and εt−1 are uncor-
related, which is likely since the lagged dependent variable is included in the model. εt and
εt−1 are correlated if ∆εt and ∆εt−2 are correlated, which can be tested.
10In the static speciﬁcations, ∆st−2 was not included.
11Similar variables were used by Aronsson et al. (2000) in a regression of municipal tax
base, but they used a Herﬁndal-Index of political fragmentation instead of ∆PolmajM and
∆PolmajC as here.The Eﬀect of Health Care Expenditure on Sickness Absence 11
reported in the introduction, some previous research has reported no or very
limited eﬀects of aggregated health care expenditure on the health status of the
population. Moral hazard problems is one set of explanations to why public
health care expenditure might have no, or very limited, eﬀect on the health
status of the population and therefore also on health related work absence.
3.3 Results
Table 2 presents the estimation results for absence. All instrumental variable
estimations were done using a two-step feasible generalized method of moments
estimator, which is eﬃcient in the presence of heteroskedacity and serial corre-
lation.12 F i r s t ,t h eb a s e l i n es p e c i ﬁcation (labeled IV) is presented where eadj,
∆st−1 and ∆(w(1 − τ
mc)) were instrumented and then four other speciﬁcations
are presented to serve as comparisons. In the OLS speciﬁcation all regressors
w e r et r e a t e da se x o g e n o u sa n di nt h eI V - s m a l ls p e c i ﬁcation the education and
demographic variables were left out. In the IV-e speciﬁcation e was included
instead of its age-adjusted version and the IV-static speciﬁcation is a static ver-
sion of the ﬁrst one. The omitted education- and age-groups are El.School and
Pop1639. The derivatives ds∗/deadj|ht−1 and ds∗/de|ht−1 indicate the long run
eﬀects of health care expenditure on absence. The next six statistics, which de-
scribe the relevance and validity of the instruments, are discussed in Appendix
D, where I conclude that the instruments are valid and reasonable relevant.13
In a simultaneous test of whether eadj, ∆st−1 and ∆(w(1 − τmc)) can be
treated as exogenous, the null hypotheses of exogeneity could be rejected at the
10 percent level, which supports the use of instrumental variable estimators.14
The education and age variables in levels and in ﬁrst-diﬀerences, as well as the
year-speciﬁc ﬁxed eﬀects were included since the null hypothesis of no eﬀect
could be rejected at the 10 percent level in group-wise F-tests. ∆Women and
12Greene (2003) describes the estimator in chapter 18.
13The estimations are based on 2,547 or 2,554 observations, since the use of lags and the
ﬁrst-diﬀerence transformation reduced the number of possible observations with 3*286, and
s i n c e2 7( 2 0i nt h eO L Ss p e c i ﬁcation) were lost due to lack of data on health care expenditure.
To facilitate comparison, the OLS estimation was performed for the same years as the IV
estimations.
14The endogeneity test is based on the diﬀerence of two Hansen-Sargan statistics and is
robust against heteroscedasticity.12 The Eﬀect of Health Care Expenditure on Sickness Absence
Table 2. Estimation results, ﬁrst diﬀerence of absence
IV OLS IV-small IV-e IV-static
eadj or e 0.02 0.01 -0.03 0.03 0.03
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.04) (0.04)
∆st−1 0.26** 0.21*** 0.37*** 0.26**
(0.11) (0.03) (0.09) (0.11)
∆(w(1 − τ
mc)) -0.03 0.06*** -0.06 -0.03 -0.02
(0.04) (0.01) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
HighSchool -0.03 0.61 -0.22 0.44
(0.85) (0.82) (0.88) (0.93)
University -3.04*** -3.56*** -3.13*** -4.13***
(0.94) (0.76) (0.95) (0.91)
∆HighSchool -20.37** -20.87** -20.34** -22.30**
(9.31) (8.88) (9.28) (8.96)
∆University -48.52*** -60.11*** -48.63*** -51.91***
(14.11) (12.58) (14.08) (13.87)
Women 15.87*** 17.16*** 16.29*** 19.92***
(4.16) (3.79) (4.24) (4.24)
Pop4049 -1.65 -1.56 -1.71 -0.40
(2.70) (2.71) (2.69) (2.93)
Pop5054 -1.46 -4.34 -1.42 -2.23
(5.62) (5.57) (5.62) (5.98)
Pop5559 12.73** 12.93** 12.70** 15.67***
(5.52) (5.46) (5.51) (5.91)
Pop6064 -4.07 -4.59 -4.45 -4.77
(3.97) (3.92) (4.00) (4.46)
∆Pop4049 34.24*** 34.84*** 34.22*** 31.21***
(11.48) (11.51) (11.44) (11.99)
∆Pop5054 58.44*** 63.80*** 58.22*** 61.87***
(14.49) (14.29) (14.47) (15.34)
∆Pop5559 52.92*** 56.81*** 52.92*** 65.20***
(15.50) (14.35) (15.51) (14.98)
∆Pop6064 61.74*** 70.09*** 62.27*** 81.85***
(16.74) (15.01) (16.80) (15.97)
ds∗/deadj|ht−1 0.02 0.02 -0.05 0.04
or ds∗/de|ht−1 (0.04) (0.04) (0.05) (0.06)
Cragg-Donald 22.01 29.26 22.17 42.94
eadj or e: Shea 0.72 0.81 0.63 0.74
∆st−1: Shea 0.06 0.08 0.06
∆(w(1-τmc)): Shea 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.09
Hansen J 0.46 0.43 0.71 0.97
Serial corr. 2 0.62 0.86 0.97 0.64 0.21
Adj. R2 0.74 0.74 0.72 0.74 0.73
Sample size 2547 2554 2547 2547 2547
The regressions include year speciﬁce ﬀects. Robust standard errors are shown in parentheses.
The Asterisks ***, ** and * denote signiﬁcance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent levels.The Eﬀect of Health Care Expenditure on Sickness Absence 13
variables describing the share of the work force in various sectors were not in-
cluded in the ﬁnal regressions since these variables had no statistically signiﬁcant
eﬀects. That ∆Women had no eﬀect is surprising since women in Sweden are
known to be absent more than men, but this is probably explained by low vari-
ation in gender-composition over time. Including ∆((w − B)(1 − τmc)) instead
of ∆(w(1−τmc)), including lagged values of eadj, or estimating with two-stage
least squares instead of using the generalized method of moments estimators, did
not change the general results.15,16
Table 2 shows that health care expenditure had no statistically signiﬁcant
eﬀect on absence and the estimated standard errors are small enough to rule out
all but a minimal eﬀect.17 The diﬀerence in the estimated coeﬃcients between
in the IV estimations and the OLS speciﬁcations are negligible. This might
be explained by absence being measured at the municipal level whereas health
care expenditure was decided at the county level, or by the county councils’
weak incentive to respond to changes in absence. Using unadjusted health
care expenditure (IV-e) instead of age-adjusted (IV and others) also made little
diﬀerence, perhaps because there was little heterogeneity in the changes in age-
composition across counties.
The eﬀect of health care expenditure on absence is of course heterogeneous
and depends on what the money is spent on. Although the purpose of this study
was to estimate the eﬀect of aggregated public health care expenditure, i.e. to
estimate the average eﬀect, such heterogeneity might cause a problem when
15Robust standard errors are reported since a Pagan-Hall test indicates heteroscedasticity
in all speciﬁcations. For the OLS speciﬁcation, a White-Koenker test was used instead.
16Previous literature (e.g. Henrekson and Persson, 2004) have found statistically signiﬁ-
cant eﬀects of current unemployment and labor force participation rates on absence. Here,
national variations in these variables were captured by the year-speciﬁc ﬁxed eﬀects, while
time-invariant heterogeneity in these variables was wiped out by the ﬁrst-diﬀerence trans-
formation. Including these variables, or their lags, directly into the model did not change
the general results. Whether non-working individuals are unemployed, not part of the labor
force, or absent, is probably aﬀected by variables not included in the model, making labor-
force participation and unemployment endogenous. Due to this and the diﬃculty of ﬁnding
strong instruments for two additional endogenous regressors, those variables were not included
in the ﬁnal speciﬁcation.
17For the baseline speciﬁcation, the 99 percent conﬁdence interval for health care expendi-
ture reaches down to -0.07. In percentage terms a coeﬃcient of -0.07 translates to that a 10
percent increase in health care expenditure would only reduce absence by approximately 0.21
percent.14 The Eﬀect of Health Care Expenditure on Sickness Absence
estimating the eﬀect with IV methods (Heckman et al., 2006). Here, the problem
would arise if the marginal expenditure identiﬁed by the instrumental variables
were non-representative in terms of their eﬀect on absence. Diﬀerent instrument
variables would then result in diﬀerent parameters being estimated. To judge
w h e t h e rt h i si sas e r i o u sp r o b l e mi nt h ep resent study, the baseline estimation
was performed with numerous combinations of instrumental variables, which all
gave similar results.18
The small eﬀect of health care expenditure on absence might be explained
partly by moral hazard problems; that is, individuals might reduce their per-
sonal investments in health, when public health care expenditure is increased.
For example, people might exercise less and eat more unhealthy food when they
have access to better health care. These moral hazard problems can also be one
explanation to why several previous studies (see e.g. Aakvik and Holmås, 2006,
or Nixon and Ulmann, 2006) have found no or limited eﬀect of health care ex-
penditure on the health statues of the population. It may also be that variations
in health care expenditure in industrialized countries such as Sweden have less
to do with curing and more to do with caring (Newhouse, 1977). That is, health
care expenditure on the margin might be spent so that the patients’ comforts
increase but without leading to quicker recoveries. Other contributing expla-
nations could be migration of sick individuals to counties with higher health
care expenditure and vice versa, low eﬃciency in public health care, or perhaps
weak correlation between total health care expenditure and that directed to the
working age population, or even a weak connection between health and absence.
18Some instrument combinations were found to be weak or invalid (the criteria used here
were Cragg-Donald>10 and Shea>0.04 for all endogenous regressors, and Hansen J>0.10),
but 30 reasonably good combinations remained, including using changes in Herﬁndal-Indexes
of political fragmentation instead of ∆PolmajM and ∆PolmajC, and including additional
instruments such as ∆st−3. In one case, when eadjt−1, ∆PolmajM, ∆PolmajC, ∆SocM
and ∆SocC, were replaced by a variable describing the counties’ ﬁnancial resources, the lag
of that variable, and a variable describing the share of Health Care Party members in the
county government in the prior year, the coeﬃcient for eadj was negative and statistically
signiﬁcant at the 10 percent level, (coeﬀ.= -0.06, std.err=0.03). In the other cases the general
results held.
Since Arellano (1989) recommended using levels instead of diﬀerences as instruments for the
lagged dependent variable, st−2 was also tested as an instrument instead of ∆st−2.H o w e v e r ,
it was found to be weak so ∆st−2 was used instead. The ﬁnal choice of instruments was based
on the values for the baseline speciﬁcation of the instrument statistics, discussed in Appendix
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In all speciﬁcations lagged absence was signiﬁcant at the 5 percent level,
implying persistence. The estimated coeﬃcient is lower in the OLS speciﬁcation,
which was expected since ∆εt and ∆εt−1 will be negatively correlated, at least
if εt and εt−1 are uncorrelated.
The ﬁrst diﬀerence of average after tax labor income was only signiﬁcant in
the OLS speciﬁcation. A probable explanation to the positive estimate in that
speciﬁcation is that a reduction in absence lessens average labor income since
the marginal non-absent individual likely has a lower labor income compared
to the average in the non-absent population. If this relationship varies across
municipalities, that could also account for the non-signiﬁcant estimates in the
other speciﬁcations. The limited eﬀect of net income could also result from
this variable having opposite substitution and income eﬀects on the demand for
absence. The coeﬃcients might also be aﬀected by the impact that net income
has on absence through its eﬀect on investments in health capital.
The results indicate that university graduates had a better absence develop-
ment than others, and show that the coeﬃcients for the diﬀerenced educational
variables have the expected sign and relative size. Based on these estimates no
conclusion can be drawn whether higher education was correlated with lower
absence since those with higher education were exposed to fewer health risks
at work, had better health and health development of other reasons, or had
occupations that reduced their need for absence for a given health.19 Of course,
these variables might also capture characteristics that aﬀect the absence of in-
dividuals belonging to other educational groups.
The share of women had a statistically signiﬁcant positive eﬀect, which was
expected since absence increased much faster for women than for men during
the study-period, partly caused by more psychological problems such as stress
reactions and anxiety (Riksförsäkringsverket, 2004). Those 55 to 59 was accord-
ing to the estimations, the age-group with the worst absence development. The
coeﬃcients for the diﬀerenced age variables all have the expected signs. That
the coeﬃcients for ∆Pop5559 and ∆Pop6064 are not even higher reﬂects the
lower labor force participation rate in these age-groups.
Table A2 (in Appendix A) shows that the result regarding the eﬀect of
health care expenditure prevailed when absence were estimated separately for
19Grossman (2000) discusses possible explanations for the correlation between education
and health on an individual level.16 The Eﬀect of Health Care Expenditure on Sickness Absence
women and men. However, the estimates for the lagged dependent variable are
not reliable because of weak instruments, especially for men, and this might
also aﬀect the other estimates in the dynamic IV speciﬁcations. The OLS
estimations provide a possible explanation for the weak instruments for men’s
lagged absence, namely that the persistence in absence was relatively weak for
men which results in the second lag of the dependent variable being a weak
instrument for the ﬁrst lag.
Absence because of sickness and disability were also estimated separately
(Table E1. in Appendix E). Because of interaction between Sickness and
Disability (discussed in Appendix E), both ∆Sicknesst−1 and ∆Disabilityt−1
were instrumented with their lags and included in each estimation. The results
do not allow us to reject the null hypotheses that health care expenditure has
no eﬀect on either Sickness or Disability and the estimated standard errors are
small enough to rule out all but minimal eﬀects. However, these results must be
taken with caution since the instruments for ∆Sicknesst−1 are weak, and since
second-order serial correlation casts doubt on the validity of most instruments
for the dynamic IV speciﬁcations and for the static speciﬁcation for Sickness.
(However, the p-values of the Hansen J statistic suggest that the instruments
are valid for the Sickness speciﬁcations.)
4 Discussion
The eﬀect of public health care expenditure on absence due to sickness or dis-
ability in Sweden was analyzed using an instrumental variable estimator for a
dynamic panel model. Public health care expenditure was found to have no
statistically signiﬁcant eﬀect on absence. This result is robust against changes
in model speciﬁcation and also held when separate estimations were conducted
for women and men, and for absence due to sickness and disability. The stan-
dard errors were small enough to rule out all but a minimal eﬀect of health care
expenditure.
This result increases the likelihood that general health care is over-provided
in Sweden, according to the model by Granlund (2007). However, health care
aimed at reducing absence might still be under-provided. One possible explana-
tion of the small eﬀect on absence is that the correlation between expenditure
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care was weak. It could also be that variation in health care expenditure had
less to do with curing and more to do with caring, meaning that health care
expenditure on the margin was spent so that the patients’ comforts increase
without leading to quicker recoveries (Newhouse, 1977). The Swedish counties
have weak incentive to reduce absence, which supports either of these expla-
nations. Due to these reasons, it should be stressed that it was the average
eﬀect of public health care expenditure on absence that was estimated, not the
maximal (or potential) eﬀect. Another set of explanation of the results is moral
hazard problems, i.e. people might reduce their personal investments in health
when public health care expenditure rises.
The paper relates to the literature studying the eﬀects of access to health
care or health care expenditure on health outcomes and the ﬁndings give no
support for that health care expenditure on an aggregated level improves the
health status of the population. However, the results from this paper might also
be explained by a weak connection between health and absence. For example,
the generous Swedish sickness insurance system might induce also the relatively
healthy to report sick. A topic for future research could thus be to investigate
the eﬀect of health care expenditure in this sample on other health measures,
e.g. on mortality rates. More research is also needed on the relationship be-
tween subcategories of health care and absence, for example, pharmaceutical
expenditure. Access to health care, measured by for example waiting times,
might also have an eﬀect on absence independent of health care expenditure in
general and thus be worthy of investigation in itself.18 The Eﬀect of Health Care Expenditure on Sickness Absence
Appendix A: Tables and ﬁgures
Table A1. Data deﬁnitions and data sources.
Variable Deﬁnition Source
Sickness Average number of days of absence from work due to SSIA, etc.
sickness for insured aged 16 to 64*
Disability Average number of days of absence from work due to early SSIA
retirement pension/disability for insured aged 16 to 64
Rehab Average number of days of absence from work due to SSIA
rehabilitation for insured aged 16 to 64
s Absence: sum of Sickness, Disability and Rehab* SSIA, etc.
swomen Absence for women SSIA, etc.
smen Absence for men SSIA, etc.
e Non-dental, non-pharmaceutical, public operating cost for FCC
health care, thousands of SEK** per capita
eadj Age-adjusted version of e (see Appendix C) FCC, etc.
w [Average income from work for those aged 16 to 64 SCB,SSIA
(excluding sickness and disability beneﬁts), thousands of
SEK**] / [1-absence rate], where absence rate=s/365*
(insured aged 16 to 64)/(population aged 16 to 64)
τM Proportional municipality income tax rate SCB
τC Proportional county income tax rate SCB
τMC Sum of τM and τC SCB
Women Share of women in the population aged 16 to 64 SCB
Pop1639 Share aged 16 to 39 of the population aged 16 to 64 SCB
Pop.... Pop4049-Pop6064 have corresponding deﬁnitions SCB
El.School Share of the population aged 16 to 64 who’s highest SCB
education was elementary school
HighSchool Share of the population aged 16 to 64 who’s highest SCB
education was high school or less than tree years
after high school
University Share of the population aged 16 to 64 with three years SCB
or longer education after high school
SocM Share of Social Democrats and Left Party members in SCB
municipal government
SocC Share of Social Democrats and Left Party members in SCB
county government
PolmajM Dummy variable which takes the value 1 if either of the SCB
two traditional Swedish political blocks has a majority in
the municipality government***
PolmajC Dummy variable which takes the value 1 if either of the SCB
two traditional Swedish political blocks has a majority in
the county government***
The data sources are Swedish Social Insurance Agency, SSIA, The Federation of Swedish
County Councils, FCC, and Statistics Sweden, SCB.
All monetary variables are deﬂated by CPI and expressed in 2004 years prices.
*Only absence from the 15th day of each spell is included.
**On 21 December 2006, USD/SEK=6.81.
***The two political blocks consist of the Social Democratic Party and the Left Party; and






Note: The boxes include observations from the 25th to 75th percentiles. The whiskers are 1.5
times the length of the boxes or equal the distance from the box to the minimum or maximum
values, whichever is smallest. The dots indicate outside values.








See note to Figure A1.
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Table A2. Estimation results, ﬁrst-diﬀerence of women’s and men’s absences
Women Men
IV OLS IV-static IV OLS IV-static
eadj 0.05 0.05 0.06 -0.04 -0.01 -0.04
(0.05) (0.04) (0.06) (0.04) (0.03) (0.04)
∆s
†
t−1 0.08 0.19*** 0.20 0.08**
(0.12) (0.03) (0.22) (0.03)
∆(w(1 − τ
mc)) -0.04 0.07*** -0.04 -0.02 0.03** -0.01
(0.05) (0.02) (0.05) (0.04) (0.01) (0.03)
HighSchool
† 3.26* 2.91** 3.76** -1.17 -1.18* -1.27*
(1.68) (1.45) (1.56) (0.72) (0.70) (0.76)
University
† -4.47*** -4.66*** -4.77*** -0.47 -1.04* -0.76
(1.13) (0.99) (1.12) (0.66) (0.54) (0.59)
∆HighSchool
† -16.81 -18.62* -17.20* -7.91 -8.11 -11.10
(10.40) (10.31) (10.45) (8.19) (7.29) (7.36)
∆University
† -12.74 -28.09* -12.32 -47.24*** -55.13*** -54.77***
(16.89) (15.17) (16.87) (14.44) (11.01) (11.85)
Pop4049† -0.23 -1.19 0.13 -4.34* -4.02 -4.15
(3.68) (3.51) (3.78) (2.49) (2.55) (2.61)
Pop5054† -3.94 -5.68 -3.91 5.23 4.34 5.63
(5.85) (5.59) (6.05) (4.53) (4.53) (4.61)
Pop5559† 28.26*** 24.56*** 30.16*** 0.83 0.39 0.20
(6.39) (5.79) (6.29) (4.69) (4.64) (4.68)
Pop6064† -11.14** -11.60** -11.70** 0.47 -0.34 1.53
(5.40) (5.00) (5.66) (3.94) (3.97) (4.06)
∆Pop4049† 24.63* 27.43** 24.23* 30.76*** 28.39*** 28.36***
(13.53) (13.50) (13.76) (9.91) (9.71) (9.75)
∆Pop5054† 50.42*** 52.40*** 52.67*** 29.39** 29.53** 26.76**
(16.58) (16.38) (16.90) (12.60) (12.08) (12.26)
∆Pop5559† 44.81** 46.97*** 48.40*** 32.29** 38.13*** 40.60***
(17.92) (17.38) (17.93) (14.90) (12.01) (12.16)
∆Pop6064† 80.05*** 80.77*** 85.63*** 62.84*** 72.70*** 75.11***




ht−1 0.06 0.07 -0.05 -0.01
(0.06) (0.05) (0.05) (0.04)
Cragg-Donald 14.54 42.33 6.02 44.81
eadj or e: Shea 0.72 0.74 0.75 0.75
∆s
†
t−1: Shea 0.04 0.02
∆(w(1-τmc)):Shea 0.10 0.10 0.11 0.11
Hansen J 0.88 0.93 0.90 0.80
Serial corr. 2 0.18 0.94 0.25 0.31 0.26 0.34
Adj. R2 0.67 0.68 0.67 0.62 0.63 0.63
Sample size 2261 2268 2261 2261 2268 2261
† indicates that the variable is gender-speciﬁc. Also, see notes to Table 2.The Eﬀect of Health Care Expenditure on Sickness Absence 21
Appendix B: Missing data and changes in the ab-
sence variables
Data on the absence variables were missing for some of the municipalities in
1997, 1998 and 1999. Instead, aggregated data were reported for two (or some-
times three or four) municipalities in the same county. For six municipalities,
data for all three years were missing, and instead the aggregated data for three
pairs of municipalities were reported. For 37 municipalities, data for 1998 and
1999 were missing, and instead the aggregated data for 12 pairs of munici-
palities, and three groups of three, and one group of four municipalities were
reported. For seven municipalities, data for 1999 were missing, and instead the
aggregated data for one group of three and one group of four municipalities were
reported. Thus in total, 99 observations lacked data on the absence variables.
The absolute number of days of absence (days)a sw e l lt h en u m b e ro fi n s u r e d
for each group of municipalities is known. I assumed that the days were divided
among the municipalities in each group in proportion to their share of days





where i indicates the ith municipality and p indicates the group of municipalities
to which it belongs. B indicates the last year before, T the ﬁrst year after, and
M the years of missing data. This assumption was suﬃcient to get an estimate
of days for each municipality for which data were missing for only one year.
The estimated days was then divided by the number of insured, estimated in
the same way, to obtain an estimate of s for each municipality.
Using the maximum entropy method (Wilson, 1970), days for those lacking





T h en u m b e ro fi n s u r e dw a se s t i m a t e di nt h es a m ew a y ,a n dt h e na ne s t i m a t e
of s was calculated for each municipality each year. Sickness, Disability,a n d
Rehab were each estimated in this way, which is the least biased estimate pos-
sible with the information given (Jaynes, 1957).
For 1999, data on the absence variables were missing, and instead data for
October 1998 to September 1999 were reported. I used the numbers reported22 The Eﬀect of Health Care Expenditure on Sickness Absence
inﬂated with 1/8 of the change from 1998 to 2000, which assumes that changes
for the fourth quarter were of the same magnitude as the average change for the
other three quarters from 1998 to 2000, and that half of this change occurred
each year.
Estimations excluding the observations with missing data, and using the
average of the values for 1998 and 2000 instead of the calculated values for
1999, give the same general results for the baseline speciﬁcation.
As mentioned earlier, the absence variables include only days compensated
by the Swedish Social Insurance Agency, not days compensated by employers.
During 1992-1996 and April 1998-June 2003 employees were compensated by
the employer for the ﬁrst 14 days of absence; during January 1997-March 1998
for the ﬁrst 28 days; and during July 2003-December 2004 for the ﬁrst 21 days.20
Following Henrekson and Persson (2004), this was addressed using data from
The Confederation of Swedish Enterprise.
Their data cover a reasonably representative sample of 2,500 private sector
establishments and 220,000 employees. Absence from work due to sickness
was categorized by the length of the absence spells and separate ﬁgures were
reported for nine Swedish regions.21 Assuming that the absence pattern was
the same for all municipalities belonging to the same region, and the same for
the public sector as for the private sector, the original data for Sickness (and
s) were adjusted to give absences from the 15th day of absence for all years.
This was done by multiplying the original Sickness-variable by the percentage
of work time lost due to sickness absence from the 15th day of absence divided
by the percentage of work time lost due to sickness that was covered by the
Swedish Social Insurance Agency.22,23 The variable s was then created by adding
20The self-employed were allowed to choose among insurance plans which diﬀered in when
they began to reimburse for lost income due to sickness. One plan stipulated that the self-
employed were reimbursed ﬁrst from the 31st day, but this should have a small eﬀect, if any,
on the estimations.
21The data for 1997 and 1998 were published in SAF (1998) and SAF (1999), respectively.
Data for 2003 and 2004 were provided directly by the company, Löneanalyser AB.
22From the data it is not possible to directly identify the shares of work-hours lost due to
absence during days 15 to 21; instead the shares for days 15 to 20 are reported, which were
multiplied by 7/6. Unfortunately this causes a slight overestimation of absence for the years
2003 and 2004, because of less absence the 21st day compared to the average for days 15-20.
The absence patterns for the ﬁrst and second halves of 2003 were assumed identical in order
to adjust the data.
23For 1997 Sickness was multiplied by a factor ranging from 1.12 to 1.23 depending on theThe Eﬀect of Health Care Expenditure on Sickness Absence 23
Disability and Rehab to the adjusted version of Sickness. swomen and smen
were created similarly. Table 1 reports adjusted versions of these variables.
Appendix C: Age-adjustment of health care ex-
penditure
The age-adjustment was based on an index of age dependent health care con-
sumption produced by Statistics Sweden, which was used to calculate intergov-
ernmental equalization grants for counties until 1995.24
For somatic short-term health care, psychiatric care, and geriatric care, the
national average of treatment days for the age-groups 0-14, 15-44, 45-64, 65-79
and 80- were provided each year by the National Board on Health and Welfare.
The average number of physician consultations in primary health care and
hospital connected health care were provided by the County Council of Skåne
for 1991-1993 (covering only the county of Malmöhus, which became a part of
Skåne in 1998) and for 2001-2004. To avoid regional diﬀerences, only data from
former Malmöhus were used for the last period as well. These sources were used
since no national ﬁgures were available. For 1991-1993 the data were reported
for the same ﬁve age-groups as above, but for 2001-2004 eight age-groups were
used: 0-4, 5-14, 15-24, 25-44, 45-64, 65-74, 75-84, and 85-. Based on this data,
percentage changes each year were estimated for the two consultations types for
the age-groups 0-14, 15-44, 45-64, and 65-. Then the number of consultations in
each of the eight age-groups were calculated for 1993-2000 using the estimated
percentage changes for the group 0-14 for the age-groups 0-4 and 5-14, etc.
Using these ﬁgures and population data, the expected number of treatment
days and physician consultations per inhabitant were calculated for each county,
each year, for each type of health care. These numbers were then divided by
the national average to obtain indexes, which were aggregated using each health
care category’s national cost-share each year as weight. The cost-shares were
region. The corresponding ﬁgures for 1998, 2003, and 2004 are 1.03 to 1.05; 1.01 to 1.04; and
1.01 to 1.07, respectively. For all other years the factor was of course 1.
24Two other methods have been used by Statistics Sweden since 1995, the ﬁrst based on a
regression of health care expenditure on a number of macro-variables. This method was not
used here since it can capture not only diﬀerences in need for health care but also diﬀerences
in preference and resources. The second method was not used here since it depends on the
number of patients with particular diagnoses, which is likely to be endogenous.24 The Eﬀect of Health Care Expenditure on Sickness Absence
calculated from data obtained from Statistics Sweden for the years 1993-2003.
The average cost-shares were; somatic short-term health care (0.5); psychi-
atric care (0.08); geriatric care (0.05); physician consultations in primary health
care (0.19) and physician consultations in hospital connected health care (0.18).
These ﬁve categories accounted for approximately 95 percent of non-dental non-
pharmaceutical health care consumption. Finally, age-adjusted health care ex-
penditure (eadj) was calculated by dividing health care expenditure (e)w i t h
the appropriate index for each observation.
Appendix D: Relevance and validity of the instru-
ments
Table 2 reports the Cragg-Donald weak identiﬁcation statistic, which is the
smallest eigenvalue of the matrix analog to the F-statistic from the ﬁrst-stage
regressions. Since the models include several endogenous variables, this statistic
is reported instead of the F-statistic. Based on the tabulation by Stock and Yogo
(2005) of critical values for the Cragg-Donald weak identiﬁcation statistic, the
instrument is judged to be strong if the statistic is above 13.95 in the dynamic
or 15.72 in the static speciﬁcation.25 The statistic is well above these values in
all speciﬁcations.
As a complement to this test, Shea’s (1997) partial R-squared measure of in-
strument relevance for models with multiple endogenous variables is reported.
Shea did not provide any critical values, but mentioned 0.05 as an example
when the instrument set is not very relevant for an endogenous regressor, and
noted that low relevance increases asymptotic standard errors and increases the
inconsistency of the estimates whenever instruments are not perfectly exoge-
nous. The Shea values in Table 2 are above 0.05 for all endogenous regressors,
especially for eadj, but are quite close (0.06) for ∆st−1 in two speciﬁcations.
Together the Cragg-Donald and Shea statistics indicate that the instruments
25The critical values used are those for a maximum bias of 0.05 relative to OLS for a two-
stage least squares (TSLS) estimator. No critical values are provided for a general means of
moments (GMM) estimator, and these values are only approximate for the GMM estimator,
since it diverges somewhat from the TSLS estimator because of heteroscedasticity and auto-
correlation. But at least the test indicates strong instruments for the TSLS estimator, which,
as discussed in the text, gives similar results.The Eﬀect of Health Care Expenditure on Sickness Absence 25
are, at least, reasonably relevant for all the endogenous regressors.
The Hansen J statistic is the p-value of the Hansen test of overidentifying
restrictions, where the joint null hypothesis is that the instruments are valid,
i.e., uncorrelated with the error term. This test is consistent in the presence
of heteroskedasticity and serial correlation, and supports the exogeneity of the
instruments used.
Serial corr. 2 reports the p-value of a t-test of serial correlation of the
second order. This test was conducted since the exogeneity assumptions for
two of the four instruments were based on the assumption of no second-order
serial correlation. The test can be viewed as complementary to the Hansen
J test, which would also indicate that the instruments were invalid if second-
order serial correlation were too strong. For all speciﬁcations, no statistically
signiﬁcant second-order serial correlation was found. Thus, both Hansen J and
the Serial corr. 2 test support the assumption that the instruments are valid
for all speciﬁcations reported in Table 2.
Appendix E: Sickness and disability
The basic transitions between the three mutually exclusive states that an indi-
vidual can occupy are illustrated in Figure E1.26 The illustrated ﬂows are those
that are driven by other factors than economic incentives, health status and
work characteristics. The vertical arrows illustrate the eﬀects of habit forma-
tion. The diagonal arrow from Sicknesst−1 to Disabilityt illustrates the ﬂow
caused by information increasing over time regarding the expected duration of
individual’s reduced work capacity. That is, this arrow shows the ﬂow between
the two states caused by better predictions about the individual’s future work
capacity, conditioned on the observed present one.
The ﬂow from Workt−1 to Sicknesst illustrates the inﬂow to absence that
is aﬀected by previous absence in the municipality, through its eﬀect on the
disutility of absence.27 One possibility is that this habit formation is not speciﬁc
26Rehab is of minor importance (Table 1) so no separate analysis was done with it as
dependent variable.
27It is less likely that there is a direct ﬂow from Work to Disability of this reason and no
such arrow is therefore drawn. It is however possible, that for example individuals with long-
lasting small reduction in work capacity go directly from Workto Disability, as a consequence
of external habit formation.26 The Eﬀect of Health Care Expenditure on Sickness Absence
to the type of non-work state. For example, a high rate of people on disability
pension in a municipality might also reduce the social cost of being on sick
leave, resulting in a correlation between Disabilityt−1 and Sicknesst,e v e ni f
no one actually moved in this direction, simply because a high rate of Disability
caused a ﬂow from Workto Sickness. Table E1 presents the estimation results
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Table E1. Estimation results, ﬁrst diﬀerence of Sickness & Disability
Sickness Disability
IV OLS IV-static IV OLS IV-static
eadj 0.05 0.04* 0.03 -0.04 -0.01 0.01
(0.04) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.02) (0.03)
∆Sick.t−1 -0.23 0.10*** 0.53*** 0.05**
(0.16) (0.03) (0.13) (0.02)
∆Dis.t−1 -0.22** -0.10*** 0.47*** 0.34***
(0.11) (0.03) (0.09) (0.03)
∆(w(1 − τ
mc)) -0.04 0.00 -0.05 0.01 0.06*** 0.03
(0.04) (0.01) (0.03) (0.03) (0.01) (0.03)
HighSchool 1.62* 1.07 1.14 -1.53** -0.33 -0.57
(0.90) (0.72) (0.77) (0.73) (0.63) (0.74)
University -0.87 -0.46 0.10 -1.90** -3.08*** -4.15***
(1.00) (0.70) (0.76) (0.83) (0.61) (0.72)
∆HighSchool 3.83 5.09 5.90 -17.05** -20.64*** -22.68***
(8.14) (8.01) (7.99) (7.50) (6.99) (6.87)
∆University -20.13 -22.48* -15.84 -19.93* -31.62*** -31.14***
(12.75) (11.51) (11.98) (11.77) (9.62) (10.49)
Women 10.17** 8.51** 6.72* 5.24 7.62*** 12.47***
(4.43) (3.44) (3.60) (3.47) (2.86) (3.31)
Pop4049 1.09 -0.66 -0.32 -2.71 -0.96 -0.40
(3.00) (2.58) (2.72) (2.27) (1.99) (2.24)
Pop5054 -4.99 -3.15 -3.12 2.24 -1.25 -0.02
(6.10) (5.07) (5.45) (5.21) (4.19) (4.63)
Pop5559 14.04** 10.22** 11.54** 0.86 2.79 4.78
(5.89) (5.19) (5.37) (4.93) (4.38) (4.88)
Pop6064 0.01 -0.87 -0.01 -5.91* -3.54 -5.40
(4.61) (3.96) (4.06) (3.54) (3.13) (3.48)
∆Pop4049 13.38 17.93* 17.22 21.35** 15.54* 13.44
(11.98) (10.49) (10.86) (10.57) (9.04) (9.41)
∆Pop5054 36.49** 33.00** 32.47** 20.56* 25.87** 27.57**
(14.61) (13.05) (13.42) (11.96) (10.70) (11.50)
∆Pop5559 35.74** 24.99* 24.56* 19.53 32.26*** 40.99***
(15.92) (13.99) (13.97) (13.72) (11.63) (11.79)
∆Pop6064 20.10 9.19 2.28 42.71*** 58.25*** 77.57***
(17.39) (14.31) (14.31) (14.05) (11.12) (11.87)
ds∗/deadj|x o
ht−1 0.04 0.05* -0.07 -0.02
(0.03) (0.03) (0.06) (0.03)
Cragg-Donald 9.92 42.94 9.92 42.94
eadj or e: Shea 0.69 0.74 0.69 0.74
∆Sick.t−1:Shea 0.03 0.03
∆Dis.t−1:Shea 0.09 0.09
∆(w(1-τmc)):Shea 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.09
Hansen J 0.27 0.37 0.00 0.44
Serial corr. 2 0.00 0.02 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.52
Adj. R2 0.59 0.62 0.61 0.70 0.77 0.74
Sample size 2547 2554 2547 2547 2554 2547
x o ds∗/deadj|ht−1 states the long run eﬀect of eadj on Sickness and Disability, respectively
excluding the eﬀect that goes through the other variable. Also, see notes in Table 2.28 The Eﬀect of Health Care Expenditure on Sickness Absence
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Abstract
In this paper, the impact of increased consumer information on brand
name and generic pharmaceutical prices is analyzed both theoretically
and empirically. The theoretical results show that an increase in informa-
tion is likely to reduce the price of brand name pharmaceuticals, while the
results regarding generics are less clear. In the empirical part of the paper,
the introduction of the substitution reform in the Swedish pharmaceuti-
cals market in October 2002 is used as a natural experiment regarding the
eﬀects of increased consumer information on pharmaceutical prices. The
results clearly show that the reform has lowered the price of both brand
name- and generic pharmaceuticals.
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1I n t r o d u c t i o n
In this paper, a reform of the Swedish pharmaceutical market will be used to
study the eﬀects of increased consumer information about price diﬀerences in
medically equivalent treatments (branded and generic drugs) on the pricing
policy of pharmaceutical ﬁrms.
There is a vast theoretical literature concerning the eﬀects of imperfect con-
sumer information on pricing and market structure. Stigler (1961) showed that
imperfect information creates market power and prices above competitive levels;
while Diamond (1971) showed that if information is costly, this could lead to an
equilibrium where ﬁrms charged the monopoly price rather than the competitive
price. In addition, Salop and Stiglitz (1977) presented a model where low-cost
stores had higher sales because low search cost individuals actively seek them
out, while only high search cost individuals patronized the high cost stores.
They also established that costly information could lead to market equilibria
where the law of one price does not hold. In a related study, Stiglitz (1979)
showed that under imperfect information, increasing the number of ﬁrms could
actually reduce competition and increase prices.
Turning to theoretical models of pharmaceutical markets, Frank and Salkever
(1992) have shown that an increase in the number of informed consumers will
lead to lower brand name pharmaceutical prices. Also, based on a conjecture by
Grabowski and Vernon (1992) that an increase in the number of informed cus-
tomers (i.e. cross-price sensitive consumers) would increase the negative impact
of entry on brand name pharmaceutical prices, Frank and Salkever showed that,
theoretically, this is not necessarily the case. Our theoretical model, presented
in section 3 below, will be a modiﬁed version of the Frank and Salkever model.
Only a few empirical tests of how consumer information aﬀects prices in
health care markets exist. Pauly and Satterthwaite (1981) studied how the
market for a reputation good (i.e. a good that is marketed mainly through
recommendation from friends, relatives or colleagues) such as physician services
was aﬀected by additional primary care physicians entering the market. Since
this increases consumer search costs in their model, this will also make each pri-
mary care physicians demand curve become less elastic, leading to higher prices.
In a more recent paper, Sorensen (2000) studied the relationship between imper-
fect consumer information and prices among prescription pharmaceuticals. The2 Consumer Information and Pharmaceutical Prices ...
data were collected from pharmacies in upstate New York, and the price diﬀer-
ences among medically equivalent prescriptions were found to be large. In fact,
on average the highest listed price exceeded the cheapest available alternative
by as much as 50 percent. In addition, the results give support to a consumer
search cost model, since frequently purchased pharmaceuticals had both lower
markups and lower price diﬀerences when compared to one-time prescription
pharmaceuticals.
In October 2002, the Swedish pharmaceuticals market was reformed. The
reform (Lag 2002:160) required that pharmacists inform the consumers if there
are substitute products available, as well as that the cheapest available substi-
tute product would be provided within the Swedish pharmaceuticals insurance
system. The reform also required that thec o n s u m e r sa r eg i v e nt h eo p p o r t u n i t y
to buy the prescribed pharmaceutical product instead of the cheapest available
product, paying the diﬀerence in price between the products themselves. This
means that under the new regulations, consumers have more information about
the price diﬀerence between the prescribed (often brand name) product and
the cheapest available (generic) alternative than they had prior to the reform.
As such, the introduction of the substitution reform can be seen as a natural
experiment where consumers are given more information about price diﬀerences
between identical medical treatments.
In this paper, the introduction of the substitution reform will be used to
empirically measure the eﬀects of increased consumer information on brand
name and generic pharmaceutical prices. Our theoretical model shows that an
increase in information is likely to reduce the price of brand name pharmaceuti-
cals, but the results regarding generics are less clear. Hence, the main hypothesis
to be tested is if the substitution reform, by increasing consumer information
about pharmaceutical prices and available generic substitutes, has decreased
the price of brand name and/or generic pharmaceuticals. In addition, we will
test whether the possible price response diﬀers between brand name and generic
drugs and also study additional heterogeneity in the reform-eﬀect, suggested by
the theoretical model. The empirical analysis is performed using monthly data
on pharmaceuticals sold January 2001 to October 2006.
The paper contributes to the existing literature in the following ways; ﬁrst,
contrary to previous theoretical studies, our theoretical model analyses how
both brand name- and generic pharmaceuticals are aﬀected by increased con-Consumer Information and Pharmaceutical Prices ... 3
sumer information. Second, previous studies of the introduction of substitution
reforms in European pharmaceuticals markets (e.g. Buzzelli et al., 2006) use
pharmaceutical price indexes as their dependent variable. As such, they cannot
discriminate between those changes in the pharmaceutical price index caused
by changed pharmaceutical prices and those caused by changed quantities for
brand name- and generic drugs. The use of pharmaceutical price indexes also
makes it impossible to study heterogeneity in the reform-eﬀect among brand
name- and generic drugs. The introduction of the substitution reform and the
use of individual pharmaceutical price data in our paper make it possible to
study both how pharmaceutical prices were aﬀected by the reform, as well as
possible heterogeneity in the reform-eﬀect among brand name pharmaceuticals
and generics. The main ﬁnding from this paper is that the reform has lowered
the price of both brand name- and generic pharmaceuticals.
The next section describes the substitution reform, while section 3 presents
the theoretical model, based on the Frank and Salkever model. Section 4
presents the data and the empirical model to be used in this study, as well
as the results from the estimation of the empirical model. Finally, in section 5
the paper’s conclusions are presented.
2 The substitution reform
The substitution reform came into eﬀect on October 1, 2002. As mentioned
above, the reform required that pharmacists inform the consumers if there are
substitute products available, as well as that the cheapest available generic
substitute product (which is considered to be a perfect substitute for the brand
name drug by the Swedish Medical Products Agency, SMPA) would be provided
within the Swedish pharmaceuticals insurance system. The pharmacist must
also inform the consumers that they can buy the prescribed pharmaceutical
product instead of the generic product if they pay the diﬀerence in price between
the products themselves. As such, the new regulations provide consumers with
more information about the price diﬀerence between the prescribed product
and the cheapest available generic alternative then before. Finally, the reform
requires that pharmacists substitute the prescribed pharmaceutical product to
the cheapest available generic (or parallel imported product) in cases when
neither the prescribing physician prohibits the switch for medical reasons, nor4 Consumer Information and Pharmaceutical Prices ...
the consumer chooses to pay the price diﬀerence between the prescribed and
the generic alternative. In cases where the physician prohibits the switch due
to medical reasons the consumer is still reimbursed.1
The reform was supposed to lower pharmaceutical costs in two diﬀerent
ways; directly, as more expensive pharmaceuticals were exchanged for cheaper
generic copies, and indirectly through increased price competition. The latter
eﬀect will be studied in this paper using data from the county of Västerbotten,
Sweden. Pharmaceuticals are sold through a nation wide government owned
monopoly, the National Corporation of Swedish Pharmacies (NCSP), which is
required to charge a uniform price for each pharmaceutical product in Sweden.
In addition, for a product to be included in the Swedish pharmaceuticals insur-
ance system the price charged by the pharmaceutical ﬁrms from the NCSP has
to be authorized by the Pharmaceutical Beneﬁts Board (PBB).
Before the substitution reform, a reference price system introduced in Jan-
uary 1993 was in eﬀect. Under that system, the Swedish National Social In-
surance Board (SNIB) set a reference price equal to 110 percent of the price
of the cheapest available generic product, and all costs exceeding this reference
price were to be borne by the consumer (RFFS 1992:20, 1996:31). The eﬀects
of the reference price system on pharmaceutical prices have been analyzed pre-
viously (see e.g. Aronsson et al., 2001; Bergman and Rudholm, 2003). The
results from Aronsson et al. showed that the introduction of the reference price
system reduced brand name pharmaceutical prices for pharmaceuticals where
generic substitutes were available at the introduction of the system. However,
Bergman and Rudholm found that the Swedish reference price system had been
eﬀective only for those products which already faced generic competition at the
introduction of the system. Before the system was introduced, generic entrants
typically set prices far below the brand name product, without capturing more
than a relatively small fraction of the market (Aronsson et al.). When the sys-
tem was introduced, the brand name manufacturers were forced to lower their
prices to a level close to that of the generics, in order for consumers to be fully
reimbursed. However, after the system had been introduced, generic entrants
had incentives to set prices in order to stay within the 10 percent limit set by
the reference price system (Bergman and Rudholm).
1During the ﬁrst 15 months after the reform, physicians chose to deny the exchange in 3
percent of the cases (National Corporation of Swedish Pharmacies et al., 2004).Consumer Information and Pharmaceutical Prices ... 5
3 Theoretical model
To study the eﬀects of increased information on brand name and generic drugs,
we turn to the model developed by Frank and Salkever (1992). We modify their
model to be able to analyze the price of generics as well. In a speciﬁcm a r k e t
there is one brand name ﬁrm, b,a n dn − 1 generic ﬁrms, that all produce one
pharmaceutical product each and have identical cost functions. Since there are
consumers who are willing to pay the diﬀerence in price between the brand name
and generic pharmaceutical in order to get the brand name pharmaceutical, it
will be assumed that consumers actually view the brand name and the diﬀerent
generic drugs as close substitutes, instead of perfect ones.2 Therefore, a ﬁrm
cannot get all informed costumers by setting their price slightly below the others.
The consumers only diﬀer in their preferences for the drugs and the information
they have about prices.
Several studies have reported that brand name products, in spite of consid-
erably higher prices than the available generic substitutes, are able to maintain
dominant positions in terms of market shares (e.g. Bond and Lean, 1977; Stat-
man, 1981; Hurwitz and Caves, 1988). For the Swedish pharmaceuticals market,
Aronsson et al. (2001) reported that some of the products in their study main-
tained market shares in excess of 80 percent even though they had a more than
50 percent markup over the price of the available generic substitutes. As such,
the principal diﬀerence between a generic ﬁrm and the brand name ﬁrm in our
theoretical model is that the brand name ﬁrm will be assumed to have a higher
market share compared to the generic ﬁrm at equal prices, due to consumer
preferences for the brand name product. Due to its high market share, we as-
sume that a change in the brand name price will have a signiﬁcant impact on
the generic prices and treat the brand name ﬁrm as a Stackelberg leader which
incorporates the generic ﬁrms’ price-responses in its pricing decision.3 It will
also be assumed that the generic ﬁrms take all other prices as given in the sense
that they do not take into account how their pricing decisions will aﬀect that
of other pharmaceutical ﬁrms. As such, the analysis will start by analyzing the
pricing decision made by the generic ﬁrms.
2During the ﬁrst 15 months after the reform, consumers chose to deny the exchange in
approximately 5 percent of the cases (Apoteket AB et al., 2004).
3The qualitative results hold even if the brand name ﬁrm is treated as a Nash player
towards the generic ones.6 Consumer Information and Pharmaceutical Prices ...
The demand function for generic product i is written
Qi = αDI
i(Pi,P j,P b,n)+( 1− α)DUI
i (Pi,n).( 1 )
α is the share of informed consumers in the market, who know the prices of
all available pharmaceutical products, and (1 − α) is the share of uninformed
consumers in the market, who only know the price of the drug they are buy-
ing. αDI
i and (1 − α)DUI
i represent the demand facing the generic ﬁrm i from
informed and uninformed consumers, respectively. Pi,P j and Pb are the prices
of the generic drug i, all other generic drugs and the brand name drug, respec-
tively, which together with the number of pharmaceutical products, n,a ﬀect the
demand for the generic drug i from the informed consumers. The demand from
the uninformed consumers is not aﬀected by other prices, but by the number of
pharmaceutical products.
The generic ﬁrm i’s proﬁt function is written
πi = Pi ∗ [αDI
i (Pi,P j,P b,n)+( 1− α)DUI
i (Pi,n)]
−Ci(αDI
i (Pi,P j,P b,n)+( 1− α)DUI
i (Pi,n)),( 2 )
where Ci(Qi) is the ﬁrm’s cost function. The marginal cost is assumed to be
positive and constant.4 The ﬁrm chooses Pi to maximize the proﬁt, which gives



















i(Pi,P j,P b,n)+( 1− α)DUI
i (Pi,n)=0 .( 3 )
The price function of generic product i can thus be written Pi(α,n,Pj,P b).A l l
generic ﬁrms are assumed to face identical demand and cost functions and will
t h e r e f o r es e tt h es a m ep r i c e ,w h i c hw ed e n o t eb yPg. The best response function
of generics is written Pg(α,n,Pb).
Accordingly, the brand name producer’s demand function is written
Qb = αDI
b(Pb,P g(α,n,Pb)) + (1 − α)DUI
i (Pb,n),( 4 )
4This assumption is not crucial for the qualitative results from the model, but it simpliﬁes
expressions and makes them easier to interpret.Consumer Information and Pharmaceutical Prices ... 7



























b(Pb,P g(α,Pb,n)) + (1 − α)DUI
b (Pb,n)=0 .( 5 )
Equation (3) and equation (5) diﬀer from each other since the brand name ﬁrm
get higher sales compared to a generic ﬁr mw i t ht h es a m ep r i c ea n db e c a u s et h e
brand name ﬁrm act as a Stackelberg leader. If
∂Pg
∂Pb > 0,5 which we assume,
either one of these diﬀerences guarantee that the brand name ﬁrm will set a
higher price than the generic ones.
3.1 The eﬀe c to fa ni n c r e a s ei ni n f o r m a t i o n
The eﬀect of an increase in the share of informed consumers (i.e. an increase in


































We assume that the second order suﬃcient condition for a maximum, δi < 0,
is fulﬁlled (Appendix 2). The mark-up, Pi − dCi
dQi, is positive. The second term
in the numerator, and therefore the ﬁrst product, will be negative if the own
price response of informed consumers is greater than the own price response of
uninformed consumers, which is a reasonable assumption. The next two terms
show how the total demand for generic i is aﬀected by a change in the share of
informed consumers. These terms are jointly positive since informed consumers
are more likely to patronize the generic product i due to price information, while
consumers in the uniformed group choose the pharmaceutical product closest
to their personal preferences, brand name or generic.
The ﬁnal terms show the indirect eﬀect on Pi of an increase in α,w o r k i n g
through the eﬀect of α on other prices. The terms dPi
dPj and dPi
dPb,w h i c ha r e
discussed in more detail in Appendix 1, are assumed to be positive. The last
two terms therefore imply that a generic ﬁrm is more likely to reduce its price
5See Appendix 1 for a discussion of these assumptions.8 Consumer Information and Pharmaceutical Prices ...
if the brand name price is reduced and that any price change of a generic ﬁrm,
due to symmetry, is enhanced by the price changes of the other generic ﬁrms.
To sum up, the direct eﬀect of an increase in the share of informed consumers
on the generic prices is not clear cut. The ﬁrst product works in the direction
of lower prices as long as the consumer becomes more price sensitive when
information about prices increases. On the other hand, the next two terms in
the numerator, DI
i and DUI
i , together have a positive eﬀect on the price change
for generic product i. Finally, the sign of the indirect eﬀect depends on the
eﬀect of α on the brand name price, to which we now will turn.




































dQb is positive and larger than the mark-up for a generic ﬁrm. The second
term will be negative if the own price response of informed consumers is greater
than the own price response of uninformed consumers, which seems reasonable
to assume. However, this term will be less negative than the corresponding one
for the generic ﬁrms due to the brand name ﬁrm’s Stackelberg role. The next
two terms show how the total demand for the brand name product is aﬀected
by a change in the share of informed consumers. Since informed consumers are
aware of the cheaper generic substitutes, they buy less from the brand name
ﬁrm than uninformed consumers and the sum of these terms will be negative.
That is, the brand name ﬁrm, unlike the generic companies, loses sales if there
is an increase in the share of informed consumers, which reduces the revenue
loss from price reductions. Therefore, this works for a higher price reduction
for brand name drugs compared to the generic drugs. The sign of the ﬁnal term
depends on the price change of the generic ﬁrms.
Given our assumptions, the theoretical model shows that it is likely that
the substitution reform, which is our exogenous measure of increased consumer
information about pharmaceutical prices, will lead to price reductions for brand
name drugs while the predictions are less clear for the generic products. We
now turn to the task of empirically testing the predictions of our model, i.e.
that the prices of brand name (and perhaps also generic) pharmaceuticals will
be reduced by the substitution reform.Consumer Information and Pharmaceutical Prices ... 9
4 The empirical analysis
4.1 Data and empirical speciﬁcation
The pharmaceutical prices in Sweden during the period January 2001 to Oc-
tober 2006 are extracted from a dataset provided by the County Council of
Västerbotten, Sweden. The data cover all prescription pharmaceuticals sold
in the county during the period and sums up to a total number of 15 million
prescriptions.
Only observations referring to pharmaceuticals considered to be exchange-
able within the substitution reform are relevant for this study. We identiﬁed
these observations by a two step procedure. First, we used a wide deﬁnition of
which pharmaceuticals that should be considered to be exchangeable within the
substitution reform. This wide deﬁnition is based on the three criteria speci-
ﬁed by the Medical Product Agency, namely that the diﬀerent pharmaceutical
products have the same active substance, are of the same form (pills, oral ﬂu-
ids, etc.) and that the packages are of similar size. In a second step, these
commodities were more carefully examined by manually comparing them to the
Medical Product Agency list over substitutable products published at the time
of the introduction of the reform. After this examination 4082 commodities,
in 856 diﬀerent exchange groups, are deﬁned to be substitutes according to the
regulations set out in the exchange reform. These commodities account for ap-
proximately 7 million prescriptions in our original sample. We can identify in
which month each prescription is sold, and there are thus a maximum of 70
observations for each commodity, 21 before the reform and 49 after, giving a
maximum number of observations of 285 740 (=4082*70). However, not all of
these pharmaceutical products are sold in Västerbotten each month, reducing
the actual number of observations to 126 904. Due to missing data for one or
more of our key variables, the ﬁnal sample consists of 105 587 observations.
Our dataset does not include information about which product that is the
brand name product. From the theoretical model we know that brand name
ﬁrms will distinguish themselves by setting higher prices than their competi-
tors. This is also supported by previous empirical studies (e.g. Aronsson et al.,
2001; Bond and Lean, 1977; Statman, 1981; Hurwitz and Caves, 1988). Thus,
Brand is an indicator variable that takes the value one if the pharmaceutical
has had the highest price in the exchange group both in the ﬁrst and third six10 Consumer Information and Pharmaceutical Prices ...
months periods prior to the reform. The six month period is used to reduce the
problem of not all commodities being sold each month, and two examination
periods are used to reduce the risk of our labeling being aﬀected by temporary
price changes. We choose examination periods prior to the reform, since the
reform may reduce price diﬀerences between brand name and generic drugs,
making labeling based on periods after the reform less robust. In the 9 percent
of the cases where the pharmaceutical had the highest price in only one of these
periods, a closer examination was performed where a pharmaceutical was clas-
siﬁed as a brand name drug if there were only one producer not belonging to
the group of the most common generic producers in the Swedish market.6 The
remaining pharmaceuticals, where no apparent brand name producer could be
identiﬁed were all treated as generics.7
As stated earlier, the main purpose of this paper is to study the eﬀect of
an increase in consumer information due to the introduction of the substitution
reform on the prices of brand name and generic pharmaceuticals. Therefore,
our focus will be to achieve unbiased estimates of the reform-eﬀect. As such, we
use product-speciﬁc ﬁxed eﬀects to capture several of the eﬀects that according
to equations (3) and (5) can explain the diﬀerence in price levels between phar-
maceutical products, and focus our attention on changes in the prices caused by
changes in the shares of informed consumers, as described in equations (6) and
(7). The latter two equations reveal several variables which will inﬂuence the
reform-eﬀect. We will therefore take them as starting points to study hetero-
geneity in the reform-eﬀect as well. Since we are not able to model all diﬀerences
between the two equations, we estimate the models separately for brand name
products and generics, allowing the parameter estimates to diﬀer. However,
the speciﬁcation for the two groups will include the same variables. Below, we
therefore only discuss the speciﬁcations for one of the two groups, brand name
products.
From equation (7) we know that the eﬀect of an increase in α on the brand
6In Sweden, there are some producers that specialize in producing and selling generic
products in several of the substitution groups covered in this study. These are easily identiﬁed
in our dataset.
7All regressions have also been performed excluding these 9 percent of the cases. All
qualitative results from the estimations presented below are unchanged, and these results
have thus been excluded in order to save space.Consumer Information and Pharmaceutical Prices ... 11
































The ﬁrst product on the right hand side includes the following four terms: the
markup over marginal cost, the diﬀerence in own price response of informed and
uninformed consumers, the second derivative of the brand name ﬁrm’s proﬁt
maximization problem, and the change in information due to the introduction
of the substitution reform. Our data allow us to study heterogeneity in the ﬁrst
and forth terms.8 First, the markup is assumed to be a linear function of our






= γ0 + γ1 lnmarkupi.( 9 )
lnmarkupi is the logarithm of the diﬀerence between the average price for
pharmaceutical product i in the pre-reform period and the minimum price in
the group of exchangeable products during that period.9 As such, this variable
is deﬁned for pharmaceutical i. Mathematical formulas used to calculate this
and other proxy variables are presented in Appendix 3. Second, the change in
information is written
dα = γ3dDt + γ4d(infog ∗ Dt), (10)
where D is an indicator variable taking the value one after the introduction of
the substitution reform, and infog is our proxy for the level of information avail-
able for consumers in exchange group g before the introduction of the reform.
This is deﬁned as the extra expenditure on pharmaceuticals in exchange group
g prior to the reform compared to the expenditure if the given quantity would
8We do not model any heterogeneity in the second and third term. This reduces the
number of interaction terms in our full model, but, similarly to the omission of interaction
terms later discussed in Appendix 5, this do not cause any bias.
9Using the minimum price in the group of exchangeable products as a proxy for marginal
cost is similar to the approaches adopted by Grabowski and Vernon (1992) and Rudholm
(2001). The logarithm is used since the dependent variable will also be in logarithmic form.
γ0 is included to capture the average of the diﬀerence between the minimum price and the
marginal cost.12 Consumer Information and Pharmaceutical Prices ...
have been bought at the lowest price in the exchange group each month, mea-
sured in percent. Following Sorensen (2000), this measure is based on the notion
that if consumers systematically and over time pay more than necessary for a
given pharmaceutical within an exchange group, this reﬂects that consumers in
that group are less informed about prices of available generic substitutes than
in other groups, cet. par. The idea is that the change in the share of informed
consumers will be larger in markets with low initial information. Multiplication






∗ dα = γ0γ3dDt + γ0γ4d(infog ∗ Dt)
+γ1γ3(lnmarkupi ∗ dDt)
+γ1γ4[lnmarkupi ∗ d(infog ∗ Dt)]. (11)
In the second product in equation (8), our division of the sample in brand
name and generic pharmaceuticals in part controls for diﬀerences in the term
DI − DUI between pharmaceutical ﬁrms, and we do not model any remaining
heterogeneity in this term or in the second derivative, δb. What remains in the
second product is dα, which is measured as described above.
The third product in equation (8) shows that the change in the price of the
brand name producer can also be aﬀected by price changes of generic products,
caused by a change in the proportion of informed consumers. The eﬀect on the
generic prices in an exchange group mostly depends on the same variables as
the eﬀect on the brand name prices. In addition it depends on the markup of
the generic ﬁrms, which does not directly aﬀect the price change of the brand
name drug. To study whether this indirect eﬀect has any signiﬁcant eﬀect on
the brand name price, we therefore identify the term
dPg
dα by diff lnmarkupi,
which is the diﬀerence between the average markup in the exchange group g
and the markup for the brand name drug i.10 dα is measured as presented
above and we do not model any heterogeneity in the term dPb
dPg. Therefore, the
third product in equation (8) leaves us with the two additional interaction terms
diff lnmarkup ∗ D and diff lnmarkup ∗ info ∗ D.
So far, only the variables of main interest for this study as presented in
equation (8) have been discussed, i.e. the variables that are supposed to capture
10This speciﬁcation for the logarithmic markup of the other drugs in the exchange group is
chosen in order to reduce the multicollinarity problem which otherwise could be a problem.Consumer Information and Pharmaceutical Prices ... 13
the eﬀects of increased consumer information due to the substitution reform.
However, as can be seen in equation (5), the price will also depend on n,w h i c h
in our empirical model will be measured by the number of products sold in a
speciﬁc substitution group each month. The interaction terms n∗D and n∗info∗
D are included since the studies of Stiglitz (1979) and Frank and Salkever (1992)
indicated that the eﬀect on prices of the number of products can be aﬀected
by the share of informed consumers. A trend variable, Trend, is included in
order to account for possible common price trends. Finally, product-speciﬁc
ﬁxed eﬀects, θi,h a v eb e e ni n c l u d e di no r d e rt oa l l o wf o rd i ﬀerent intercepts for
the I diﬀerent products. The empirical speciﬁcation of the most general price
equation for brand name- and generic pharmaceuticals can thus be written
lnPriceit = β1Dt + β2(infog ∗ Dt)+β3(lnmarkupi ∗ Dt)
+β4(lnmarkupi ∗ infog ∗ Dt)+β5(diff lnmarkupi ∗ Dt)
+β6(diff lnmarkupi ∗ infog ∗ Dt)+β7nit + β8(nit ∗ Dt)
+β9(nit ∗ infog ∗ Dt)+β10Trendt + θi + εit. (12)
Descriptive statistics for all variables included in the empirical estimations
a r ep r e s e n t e di nT a b l e1 . lnPrice is the logarithm of the price of the phar-
maceutical per one hundred deﬁned daily dozes expressed in Swedish crowns
in ﬁxed October 2006 prices.11 Comparing the descriptive statistics for brand
name and generic products, prices are roughly the same in the two groups.
However, as can be seen in Table 1, the markup over marginal cost is larger
for the sample containing brand name pharmaceuticals. Also, the descriptive
statistics for diff lnmarkup show that the competing products in an exchange
group on average have a lower price than the brand name product, while the
opposite is true for generics. As such, the similar prices for brands and generics
in Table 1 are due to a selection eﬀect, where generic ﬁrms to a large extent
have chosen to enter markets where the price is high. In addition, Table 1 shows
that the number of products is larger in the subsample for generics, as is the
level of previous information.
11Deﬁned daily doses (DDDs) is a World Health Organization measure of drug quantity.14 Consumer Information and Pharmaceutical Prices ...
Table 1. Descriptive statistics
Brands Generics
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev.
Price 1796.04 4359.74 1727.62 5137.14
lnPrice 6.64 1.18 6.39 1.31
D 0.67 0 .47 0.67 0 .47
info 7.98 22.51 12.90 81.63
lnmarkup 4.34 1.49 3.21 1.62
diff lnmarkup -0.28 0.59 0.97 1.12
n 2.35 1.44 3.29 1.56
Trend 33.99 20.05 33.09 19.45
info ∗ D 5.15 16.44 8.74 65.17
lnmarkup ∗ D 2.90 2.37 2.10 1.99
lnmarkup ∗ info ∗ D 26.46 101.03 32.65 371.04
diff lnmarkup ∗ D -0.18 0.51 0.69 1.08
diff lnmarkup ∗ info ∗ D -1.10 9.34 13.91 99.60
n ∗ D 1.66 1.70 2.24 2.07
n ∗ info ∗ D 15.02 55.61 28.86 119.17
Nr. lnmarkup 47008 57861
Nr. 47121 58466
Products 873 1613
Nr. lnmarkup is the number of observation for the variables including lnmarkup or
diﬀ lnmarkup while Nr. is the number of observations for all other variables.
In equation (12), the following variables might be endogenous in the sense
that these variables correlate with the error term; info, lnmarkup, diff lnmarkup
and n. The available dataset does not contain any reasonable variables to be
used as instruments, hence endogeneity has to be addressed in some other way.
In order to be able to later conclude which result that might be driven by
endogeneity, we therefore discuss in Appendix 4 how the correlation between
t h ee r r o rt e r ma n dt h e s ev a r i a b l e sa r ee x p e c t e dt oa ﬀect the estimates of the
diﬀerent parameters. One should however keep in mind that these variables
are proxy-variables and that the estimators can therefore also be biased due to
measurement errors. Since bias in the estimators related to the variables men-
tioned above might aﬀect the estimated reform-eﬀect, we show in Appendix 5Consumer Information and Pharmaceutical Prices ... 15
how we can create a simple model, without the interaction variables, in order to
estimate the reform-eﬀect. In short, we show that the estimator for the reform
parameter, β1, will be an unbiased estimator of the average reform-eﬀect if the
interaction variables are left out from the speciﬁcation. The explanation is that
this estimator will capture the linear relationship between this variable and the
omitted interaction variables (e.g. Greene, 2003, Chapter 8).
Due to low variation in the number of products during the period of study,
the remaining possibly endogenous variable, n,m o s tl i k e l yo n l yh a sav e r y
limited inﬂuence on the estimated reform-eﬀect. During the study-period, it
is likely that the bulk of the correlation between n and the reform is due to
the eﬀect the reform has on the number of products, and that only a smaller
fraction of the correlation is due to exogenous variation in n. Therefore, not
controlling for n in the regression probably gives a better estimate of the total
reform-eﬀect.12 As such, the speciﬁcation which will be used to estimate the
average eﬀect of the reform for both brand name- and generic pharmaceutical
subsamples is written
lnPriceit = β1Dt + β10Trendt + θi + εit, (13)
where all included variables are exogenous. In all estimations, we use a Prais-
Winsten estimator which corrects for ﬁrst order serial correlation in the error
terms. In addition the error terms are allowed to be heteroskedastic and corre-
lated within ATC-groups.13
4.2 The adjustment process
Two circumstances give ﬁrms an incentive to gradually adjust their price after
the reform.14 First, there is incomplete information for ﬁrms about the reactions
of consumers and other ﬁrms to the reform. Second, price increases are rarely
12We will also estimate the basic model including the number of ﬁrms, n,i no r d e rt os t u d y
how this aﬀects the parameter estimates for the reform indicator variable.
13In the World Health Organization’s Anatomical Therapeutic Chemical (ATC) classiﬁca-
tion system, the drugs are divided into diﬀerent groups according to the organ or system
on which they act, and their chemical, pharmacological and therapeutic properties. In the
ATC-groups used here, drugs which share the same chemical substances are grouped together.
14Since pharmaceutical ﬁrms knew about the reform before it came into eﬀect in October,
2002, it is also possible that they started to adjust to the reform before this date. If this was
the case, we would expect to obtain larger estimates of the reform eﬀect if the estimations
were performed excluding observations from the months directly before the reform. To study16 Consumer Information and Pharmaceutical Prices ...
allowed by the PBB. To capture this, we introduce the variable D/(t−R),w h e r e
R i st h et i m ef o rt h er e f o r m . W el e tt h ed e n o m i n a t o rb er a i s e dt ot h ep o w e r
µ,w h e r eµ is a parameter that will measure the curvature of the adjustment
process. As such, our basic empirical speciﬁcation including the adjustment
p r o c e s si sw r i t t e n
lnPriceit = β1Dt + β10Trendt + γ[Dt/(t − R)µ]+θi + εit. (14)
The models with adjustment are non-linear in the adjustment variable D/(t−
R). Since the models are nonlinear only due to one parameter, µ,i ti sc o n v e -
nient to estimate the models using a grid-search estimation strategy. We have
employed this method for each model setting µ to values ranging from 0 to 4
and then estimating the remaining parameters using a Prais-Winsten estima-
tor. Finally, likelihood values were used to discriminate between the diﬀerent
parameter values. The likelihood values were as well used to calculate 95 per-
cent conﬁdence intervals for the adjustment parameter, µ. As can be seen in
the notes to Tables 2 and 3, the conﬁdence intervals are not symmetric around
the point estimates. This is expected since a value of µ equaling zero lead to
an empirical model where the adjustment variable becomes equal to the reform
indicator variable.
4.3 Results
The results from the estimation for bra n dn a m ep r o d u c t sa r ep r e s e n t e di nT a -
ble 2. In order to study heterogeneity in the reform-eﬀect, we ﬁrst discuss the
results of the full model. For all variables that interact with other variables,
we only discuss the diﬀerential and the derivatives, respectively, which are eval-
uated at the mean value for each variable. The estimate of the diﬀerential
∆LnPrice/∆D from the full model shows that the average reduction in the
price of brand name pharmaceuticals due to the reform is approximately 2 per-
the importance of this possibility, we estimated all models excluding observations originating
from April 2002, when the law regarding the reform was passed by parliament, until October
2002, as well as from January 2002, when the bill was presented to parliament, until October
2002, respectively. This did not change the estimated reform eﬀect signiﬁcantly in any of
the estimated models, and in the majority of the cases the estimated reform eﬀect actually
became slightly smaller. Thus, these results indicate that the potential adjustments before
the reform were too small to have any important impact on our estimates.Consumer Information and Pharmaceutical Prices ... 17
cent,15 and there is a signiﬁcant negative trend showing an average decrease in
pharmaceutical prices of 0.2 percent per month. From the theoretical model it
is expected that if consumers had a low level of information prior to the reform
(i.e. they systematically spent more money than necessary on the pharmaceu-
ticals they bought), the reduction in brand name price after the introduction
would be large. As can be seen in the lower half of Table 2, this is also the case.
However, this result must be interpreted with caution since the estimators of
the parameters for info may be negatively biased, as discussed in Appendix 4.
The point estimate of the interaction between the reform and lnmarkup
in Table 2 shows that the eﬀect of the reform was more pronounced if the
markup was large. However, this result is not statistically signiﬁcant at con-
ventional levels. Neither does the indirect eﬀect from equation (8) (as proxied
by diff lnmarkup in our empirical model) show any signiﬁcant impact on the
reform-eﬀect on pharmaceutical prices. The positive point estimate for this
variable may be explained by a positive correlation between this term and the
error terms. Finally, expanding the informed section of the market through
the introduction of the reform is found to increase the impact of the number
of products on pharmaceutical prices, while the number of products had no
signiﬁcant eﬀect on the prices themselves.
We estimate the basic model with and without n in order to study if the
inclusion of this variable aﬀects the estimate of the reform-eﬀect. As can be seen
in Table 2, the parameter estimate for the number of products is not statistically
signiﬁcant, and the estimated reform-eﬀect is similar in size in both models. As
such, the reform-eﬀect does not seem to be aﬀe c t e db ya ne x c l u s i o no ft h e
number of products from the empirical model. The estimated reform-eﬀect in
these two models is slightly lower than in the full model, but still approximately
2 percent. There is also a negative time trend of 0.2 percent per month.
15Since the dependent variable is in logarithmic form, the exact change in price (in percent)
should for dummy variables be calculated using the formula 100∗[exp(β)−1]. However, since
the parameter estimates are small, using the exa c tf o r m u l ag i v e st h es a m er e s u l t sa su s i n gt h e
parameter estimates directly after rounding.18 Consumer Information and Pharmaceutical Prices ...
Table 2. Brand name prices
Full Basic+n Basic Basic+adj.
D 22.32∗∗ -18.85∗∗∗ -18.86∗∗∗ -56.88∗∗∗
(11.13) (5.71) (5.70) (17.19)
Trend -2.01∗∗∗ -2.01∗∗∗ -2.01∗∗∗ -1.53∗∗∗
(0.51) (0.52) (0.50) (0.47)
n 1.60 -0.23
(1.36) (0.79)
info ∗ D -4.35∗
(2.48)
lnmarkup ∗ D -6.25∗∗
(2.94)
lnmarkup ∗ info ∗ D 0.71∗
(0.39)
diff lnmarkup ∗ D 1.98
(5.84)
diff lnmarkup ∗ info ∗ D 1.20∗
(0.67)
n ∗ D -2.28
(1.68)
n ∗ info ∗ D -0.04
(0.05)
D/(t − R) (γ) 38.14∗∗∗
(13.89)
D/(t − R) (µ) 354.00
(see note)
∆lnPrice/∆D -19.25∗∗∗ -18.85∗∗∗ -18.86∗∗∗ -42.40∗∗∗
(5.60) (5.71) (5.70) (12.25)
dlnPrice/d(info ∗ D) -1.73∗
(0.99)
dlnPrice/d(lnmarkup ∗ D) -0.62
(4.12)
dlnPrice/ 11.59
d(diff lnmarkup ∗ D) (7.37)




Sample size 47008 47121 47121 47121
Log likelihood 76724 76858 76859 76868
The reported values are the estimates multiplied by 1000. The regressions include product-
speciﬁc ﬁxed eﬀects. Robust standard errors, conditioned on the parameter, µ, are reported
in parentheses. ***, ** and * denote signiﬁcance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent level, respectively.
The 95%-conﬁdence interval for µ is 0<µ<1086. The diﬀerential/derivatives are evaluated at
the mean for each variable. For D/(t-R)µ t h em e a ni nt h ep o s t - r e f o r mp e r i o di su s e d .Consumer Information and Pharmaceutical Prices ... 19
The results from the model with the adjustment variable show that the esti-
mated reform-eﬀect is larger than in the basic model, with an estimated average
price reduction during the study-period of 4 percent. One explanation for this
result is that including the adjustment parameter in the empirical speciﬁcation
changes the parameter estimate for the time trend from -0.20 to -0.15 percent
per month. The estimate for the reform dummy in this model, minus 6 per-
cent, can be interpreted as an estimate of the long run eﬀect of the reform.
The relatively large standard errors of this estimate, nearly 2 percent, is likely
caused by that the correlation between D and D/(t−R)µ is as high as 0.82 (e.g.
Greene, 2003, Chapter 4). According to a likelihood-ratio test, we can reject
the hypothesis of an instant adjustment at the time of the reform. We therefore
regard the estimates from the model with the adjustment variable as the more
reliable ones. The estimated reform-eﬀect for the model with adjustment is
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Figure 1. Brand name prices, estimated reform eﬀect with 95% CI20 Consumer Information and Pharmaceutical Prices ...
Table 3. Generic prices
Full Basic+n Basic Basic+adj.
D 35.85∗∗∗ -11.02∗∗∗ -10.98∗∗∗ -135.85∗∗
(12.08) (1.70) (1.70) (55.49)
Trend -2.67∗∗∗ -2.75∗∗∗ -2.74∗∗∗ -2.01∗∗∗
(0.75) (0.76) (0.76) (0.62)
n 2.39∗∗∗ 0.75
(0.73) (0.57)
info ∗ D -1.37
(1.03)
lnmarkup ∗ D -8.03∗∗∗
(2.38)
lnmarkup ∗ info ∗ D 0.22
(0.17)
diff lnmarkup ∗ D -10.82∗∗∗
(4.16)
diff lnmarkup ∗ info ∗ D 0.19
(0.14)
n ∗ D -2.50∗∗
(1.05)
n ∗ info ∗ D 0.01
(0.01)
D/(t − R) (γ) 125.20∗∗
(54.51)
D/(t − R) (µ) 101.00
(see note)
∆lnPrice/∆D -11.19∗∗∗ -11.02∗∗∗ -10.98∗∗∗ -41.34∗∗∗
(1.79) (1.70) (1.70) (14.38)
dlnPrice/d(info ∗ D) -0.44
(0.36)
dlnPrice/d(lnmarkup ∗ D) -5.13∗∗
(2.53)
dlnPrice/ -8.40∗∗
d(diff lnmarkup ∗ D) (4.09)




Sample size 57861 58466 58466 58466
Log likelihood 79506 79847 79843 79855
The reported values are the estimates multiplied by 1000. The regressions include product-
speciﬁc ﬁxed eﬀects. Robust standard errors, conditioned on the parameter, µ, are reported
in parentheses. ***, ** and * denote signiﬁcance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent level, respectively.
The 95%-conﬁdence interval for µ is 0<µ<672. The diﬀerential/derivatives are evaluated at
the mean for each variable. For D/(t-R)µ the mean in the post-reform period is used.Consumer Information and Pharmaceutical Prices ... 21
The results concerning generic pharmaceutical prices presented in Table 3
indicate an average price reduction due to the reform of one percent in all three
estimated models not including the adjustment variable. Further the estimates
show a negative price trend of 0.3 percent per month. As such, the reform-
eﬀect without adjustment is smaller in size for generics than for brand name
pharmaceuticals, while the price trend is larger. Neither of the diﬀerences is
statistically signiﬁcant.
The point estimates of the derivatives at the bottom of Table 3 show that
both high values of info and lnmarkup enhance the eﬀect of the reform as
expected, but the eﬀect of info is not statistically signiﬁcant at conventional
levels. For generics, the parameter estimate for diff lnmarkup∗D, is negative
and statistically signiﬁcant at the ﬁve percent level. Our interpretation of this
is that a high markup prior to the reform of the competitors to generic i in-
creases the reform-eﬀect on the competitors, which in turns increases the need
for generic i to lower its price. As discussed in Appendix 4, potential endogene-
ity will cause the estimators related to this variable to be positively biased. As
such, this gives further support that the results are in line with our theoretical
model. Finally, as in the estimations concerning brand name pharmaceuticals,
expanding the informed section of the market through the introduction of the
reform is found to increase the impact of the number of products on pharmaceu-
tical prices, but the number of products had no signiﬁcant eﬀect on the prices
themselves.
Turning to the results from our model including the adjustment process, the
results show that the reform-eﬀect is larger than in the basic models, with an
estimated average price reduction of 4 percent. As for brand name pharma-
ceuticals, a large part of the diﬀerence between the models can be explained
by the diﬀerence in the parameter estimates for the time trend. The point es-
timates for the parameter µ, indicate that the adjustment path for generics is
less curved than that for brands. However the divergence is not statistically sig-
niﬁcant diﬀerent from zero. Further, the low value of µ results in a correlation
between D and D/(t −R)µ of 0.99, which increases the standard errors for the
parameter estimates related to these variables (e.g. Greene, 2003, Chapter 4).
The standard errors for the two estimates are over 5 percent and it is there-
fore not meaningful to discuss these estimates. However, the standard error for
the total reform-eﬀect is not inﬂuenced by the high correlation between D and22 Consumer Information and Pharmaceutical Prices ...
D/(t − R)µ.A sf o rt h eb r a n dn a m es a m p l e ,w ec a nr e j e c tt h eh y p o t h e s i so fa n
instant adjustment at the time of the reform, and we therefore regard the esti-
m a t e sf r o mt h i sm o d e la st h em o s tr e l i a b l eo n e s . T h ee s t i m a t e dr e f o r m - e ﬀect
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Figure 2. Generic prices, estimated reform eﬀect with 95% CI
Taken together, the results indicate that the eﬀects of the reform on the
price paths of pharmaceutical products are more similar for brand and generic
products than expected, with an average price reduction due to the implemen-
tation of the reform of about 4 percent. These results could be compared to
previous studies concerning the eﬀects of substitution reforms on pharmaceu-
tical prices (e.g. Buzzelli et al., 2006). In comparison, their results show an
average price reduction of 3 percent after the implementation of the substitu-
tion reforms. It should, however, be noted that they use pharmaceutical price
index data, from 16 OECD countries, and that their estimate therefore is not
directly comparable to ours. Firstly, their results include the eﬀect that theConsumer Information and Pharmaceutical Prices ... 23
substitution reforms have had on the average price through a change in the
composition of drugs. Secondly, their estimate is an average for all drugs, not
only those directly aﬀected by the reforms. Further, the study by Buzzelli et
al. does not incorporate any adjustment process in the empirical speciﬁcation.
5 Discussion
As noted by Stiglitz (1979), it has long been recognized that imperfect con-
sumer information give ﬁrms some degree of monopoly power which leads to
prices above competitive levels. In addition, Salop and Stiglitz (1977) showed
that imperfect information could lead to market equilibria where homogenous
products are sold at diﬀerent prices. The situation in the Swedish pharmaceuti-
cals market before the introduction of the exchange reform was characterized by
both these phenomena, since close substitutes such as brand name- and generic
pharmaceutical products were sold at diﬀerent prices, and since especially brand
name products seemed to be priced well above long run marginal costs.
In this paper, the introduction of the Swedish substitution reform was used
as a natural experiment regarding the eﬀects of increased consumer information
on brand name and generic pharmaceutical prices. The main hypothesis to
be tested was if increased consumer information about pharmaceutical prices
and available generic substitutes due to the introduction of the substitution
reform had led to any reduction in the price of brand name and/or generic
pharmaceuticals. Another hypothesis to be tested was whether the possible
price response due to the introduction of the reform diﬀered between brand
name- and generic drugs.
First, following Frank and Salkever (1992), a theoretical model was set up
and the eﬀects of increased consumer information on pharmaceutical prices were
analyzed. The model indicated that an increase in information would, under
reasonable assumptions, led to a price reduction for brand name products, while
the results for generic pharmaceuticals were more ambiguous. Based on our
model, we also expected that the reduction in price would be large if the markup
over marginal cost was large and/or the market had been characterized by low
levels of information before the reform.
The results form the empirical part of the paper show an average reduction
in prices due to the reform of about 4 percent during the study-period, both for24 Consumer Information and Pharmaceutical Prices ...
brand name- and generic pharmaceuticals. In addition, the results give some
support for the reform-eﬀect being ampliﬁed for pharmaceuticals in markets
which had previously been characterized by low levels of consumer information,
as well as for pharmaceuticals which prior to the reform had high markups over
marginal cost.
We are also able to present tentative results regarding how an increase in
information will aﬀect the impact of the number of products on pharmaceutical
prices. The results presented in this paper are in line with Grabowski and
Vernon’s (1992) conjecture, that expanding the informed portion of the market
should increase the price lowering eﬀect of entry.
A ﬁnal point that needs to be discussed is how the brand name product
has previously been able to set a high price relative to the generic substitutes
without losing market share in the absence of the substitution reform. Stiglitz
(1979, p 340) suggests that “a ﬂow of ignorance can be maintained either by
entry of new ﬁrms or new individuals”. This could perhaps make it possible
for, for example, a brand name producer to price its product high relative to its
generic substitutes without losing market shares. To empirically investigate this
question is outside the scope of the present paper, but warrants future research.Consumer Information and Pharmaceutical Prices ... 25
Appendix 1. Indirect eﬀects




















The ﬁrst term includes d2DI
i /dPidPj, which describes how the slope of the
demand curve facing ﬁrm i is aﬀected by a change in the price of other gener-
ics. This term will be negative if a price reduction of other drugs changes the
marginal consumer to one who is less price sensitive than the previous one.
However, without knowing the speciﬁc form of the demand function, this term
cannot be signed. Since the drugs are substitutes, the second term is positive
and states that if the other prices are reduced, this will lower the demand for
drug i, which works for a price reduction of drug i. The price response of ﬁrm
i to a price change by the brand name ﬁrm and the price response of the brand
name ﬁrm to a price change by the generic ones can be written correspondingly.
Theoretically, we cannot rule out the possibility that the ﬁrst term is negative
and dominates the second one without making more explicit assumptions about
the demand function. In this paper we will assume that dPi
dPj > 0, dPi
dPb > 0 and
dPb
dPg > 0, without assuming a speciﬁc demand function. Among the possible
demand functions that would result in the positive derivatives that we assume,
a simple linear demand function like DI
i = d1 − d2Pi + d3Pj + d4Pb can be
mentioned.
Appendix 2. Second order conditions
The second order proﬁt maximization condition for generic ﬁrm i,i sw r i t t e n
d2πi/dP 2
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The corresponding expression for the brand name ﬁrm is written
d2πb/dP2
























































Appendix 3. Deﬁnitions of empirical measures
Denote the lowest observed price in exchange group g prior to the reform by
MinPriceg.L e t Salesit denote the sales of pharmaceutical i at period t and
let Salesgt be the corresponding for all pharmaceuticals in an exchange group.
























































That is, infog is deﬁned as the extra expenditure on pharmaceuticals in ex-
change group g prior to the reform compared to the expenditure if the given
quantity would have been bought at the lowest price in the exchange group
each month, measured in percent. lnmarkupi is measured as the logarithm ofConsumer Information and Pharmaceutical Prices ... 27
the diﬀerence between the average price for pharmaceutical product i in the
pre-reform period and the minimum price in the group of exchangeable prod-
ucts during that period. Finally, diff lnmarkupi is created by subtracting
lnmarkupi from the logarithm of the diﬀerence between the average and the
lowest price in one exchange group in the pre-reform period.
Appendix 4. Endogeneity
By recalling the deﬁnition of the variable info from Appendix 3, we see that this
variable depends on prices and therefore could be correlated with the error term
of equation (12). For brand name pharmaceuticals, an increase in the pre-reform
error terms will lead to an increase in info. The inclusion of product-speciﬁc
ﬁxed eﬀects operates so that the sum of the error terms for a pharmaceutical
during the whole study-period approaches zero. Therefore an increase in the
pre-reform error terms for a pharmaceutical will lead to a reduction in the
post-reform error terms for that pharmaceutical. For brand name ﬁrms, this
results in a negative correlation between the post-reform error terms and the
variable info, which will lead to negative bias in the estimators related to info.
(The correlation between info and the pre-reform error terms does not directly
aﬀect the bias, since info is only included in the model together with the reform
dummy.)
For the cheapest generic in an exchange group, an increase in the pre-reform
error terms will lead to a reduction in info, since the denominator will increase
proportionally more than the numerator. Therefore, the post-reform error term
of this pharmaceutical will be positively correlated with info. T h i si sa l s o
true for a uniform increase of the pre-reform error terms for all generics in an
exchange group. In the estimation for generic pharmaceuticals, the estimators
related to info are therefore likely to be positively biased.
All pre-reform error terms for a pharmaceutical have a positive eﬀect on
the variable lnmarkup, except the error term for the observation that aﬀect
MinPrice which has a negative eﬀect. Since in each exchange group there is
only one observation of MinPrice, and several observations of other pre-reform
prices, it is reasonable to expect the correlation between the lowest pre-reform
price and the post-reform error terms to be smaller in absolute size than the
correlation between all pre-reform prices and these error terms. The variable28 Consumer Information and Pharmaceutical Prices ...
lnmarkup is therefore expected to be negatively correlated with the post-reform
error terms, making the estimators related to this variable negatively biased.
Since an increase in lnmarkup will lead to a decrease in diff lnmarkup,t h e
estimators related to the latter variable are positively biased.
The variable n is likely to be endogenous as well. An increase in the size of
the error term will, through its eﬀect on the price, lead to an increase in the
number of products. This will, in turn, lead to positive bias in the estimators
related to n. Including n in the estimation and treating it as exogenous might
also lead to a negative bias in the estimator of the reform-eﬀect. The reason
is that the reform is likely to have a negative eﬀect on prices, which in turn
could have a negative eﬀect on the number of products. If the number of
products is estimated to have a negative eﬀect on the prices, conditioning on it
will then work for an overestimation of the negative price eﬀect of the reform.
However, in addition the reform makes it more likely that a generic product
will be dispensed, increasing the probability of generic entry. Including n could
therefore also lead to an underestimation of the negative price eﬀect of the
reform.
Appendix 5. Measuring the reform-eﬀect
Denote the reform indicator variable by the vector D.L e tX(D) denote the it∗7
matrix for the interaction variables (info ∗ D), (lnmarkup ∗ D), (lnmarkup ∗
info ∗ D), (diff lnmarkup ∗ D), (diff lnmarkup ∗ info ∗ D), (n ∗ D) and
(n ∗ info ∗ D) and let γ be a vector of parameters related to these variables.
Ignore for simplicity that our model also includes the variables n and Trend
and product-speciﬁc ﬁxed eﬀects, θi. Then our structural model is written
lnPrice = X(D)γ + Dβ1+ε.
If this equation is estimated on reduced form, excluding X(D), the estimator






Now, in order to simplify things assume that there are observations in only
two periods, one before the reform (t =1 )a n do n ea f t e r( t =2 ), and let us
calculate what b1 represents if we omit the interaction terms from our empiricalConsumer Information and Pharmaceutical Prices ... 29





















where 0 and ε1 are vectors of zeros and error terms for the I pharmaceuticals
before the reform, and where 1, x1, x2...x7 and ε2 are vectors of ones, the
interaction variables and the error terms for the I pharmaceuticals after the














That is, if we exclude the interaction terms with the reform dummy, the average
eﬀect of these variables will still be captured by the parameter estimate of the
reform indicator variable.30 Consumer Information and Pharmaceutical Prices ...
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